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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of the Internet has created a culture o f a connected society 
dependent upon technology for communication and information sharing needs. In this 
dissertation, we hypothesize that attackers are increasingly using electronic resources that 
are capable of leaving a digital footprint, such as social media services, e-mail, text 
messages, blogs, and websites for the communication, planning, and coordination of 
attacks. In its current form, however, traffic analysis is primarily concerned with using 
communications volume to extract intelligence information, but largely ignores the 
content of communications transmissions that is needed to meet the security challenges 
and demands of continually emerging threats.
In this dissertation, we make use of the enormous amount of electronic data 
potential and propose a model framework that is capable o f predicting malicious intent 
based on mathematically sound principles in traffic flow theory. We define a set of 
objects, called threat agents, acting on a threat network and derive the set o f values and 
conditions that allow us to predict the behavior o f the network much in the same way a 
traffic flow model can be used to predict the behavior of a road system. This is 
accomplished using a set o f variables created analogous to velocity, density, and flux in 
traffic flow theory that allow us to measure the level of congestion on which the threat 
prediction is based.
In this dissertation, we also apply the data mining techniques o f classification and 
clustering analyses to derive not only the basis for our threat network but also to generate 
locational and categorical information. This contextual information provides a more 
complete picture o f the potential threat that allows us to be in a position to better 
understand and respond to impending threats in a timely manner. We present 
experimental results obtained on a set of articles appearing on the Reuters newswire to 
predict threats defined within the context of the data set. Using a threat prediction profile 
produced from the model framework, we validate our test results by mapping the 
predicted threats to actual event occurrences contained within the data set itself with 
promising results.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Computer-Mediated Communication
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) in the form of e-mail, text messaging, 
blogs, social media, and websites has become the preferred mode of communication for a 
significant portion of society. For a person with malicious intent, this format is ideal in 
that it is decentralized, widely accessible, not subjected to control or censorship, and can 
provide much desired anonymity. Recent work aimed at defending against malicious 
cyber activity, however, suggests a focus limited to threats posed by cyber-terrorism or 
cyber-warfare that include attacks on computer networks, but ignore the numerous 
communicative uses these persons make of the Internet on a daily basis (Weimann 2006). 
While these efforts are still desperately needed, we must move beyond the traditional 
cyber domain to meet the security challenges and demands o f emerging threats in a 
society where being ‘connected’ has become the norm.
1.1.1 Evidence of Past Attacks Leaving a Digital Footprint
Two high-profile attacks leaving a digital footprint that occurred in the United 
States during 2012 included the Aurora Theater and the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shootings. At the massacre in Aurora, Colorado, 12 people were killed and 58 injured in a 
movie theater just minutes into the premiere o f The Dark Knight Rises on Saturday, July
21, 2012. In preparing for the attack, the shooter’s online presence over a four month 
period included the purchase of 6,000 rounds of ammunition over the Internet as well as 
an urban assault vest, two magazine holders, and a knife from an online supplier of 
tactical gear for police and military personnel (Associated Press 2012). At the attack in 
Newtown, Connecticut, the shooter killed a total o f 28 people, including himself, and 
injured an additional two others on Friday, December 14, 2012. During the investigation, 
state police discovered that the shooter had an extensive collection of articles and 
documents related to nearly every mass murder in the United States and abroad (Khan 
2013). This information, coupled with how expertly the shooter was able to deploy his 
assault rifle after destroying the hard drives of two computers he used prior to driving to 
the elementary school, supports evidence that the shooter had been planning the attack for 
some time (Pirro 2013). In destroying the computers, officials believe he was attempting 
to hide what websites he had visited and who he might have been communicating with 
online (El-Ghobashy, Mann and James 2012).
Evidence of cyber-activity playing a role in an attack even dates back several 
years. One notable example is the Virginia Tech massacre in which a 23-year old student 
killed 32 people and wounded 25 others on the campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University on April 16, 2007. The suspect’s electronic activity prior to his 
attack included stalking incidents that used malevolent instant and text messages. He had 
also purchased a least one handgun over the Internet as well as ammunition clips, 10- 
round magazines, and other gun accessories through an online auction site in the two 
months leading up to the shootings (Seung-Hui Cho 2012). Based on the shooter’s record 
of activities through video, photos, and documents, it appeared that he was not attempting
to conceal any of his activities and actually wanted to leave a trail (Associated Press 
2007).
1.1.2 Traffic Analysis
Although the intelligence community already includes electronic communications 
as part of their traffic analysis, the focus is merely on the volume of suspect chatter as an 
indication of an elevated threat (Chatter (signals intelligence) 2011). A spike or sudden 
rise in the communications volume on a suspected terrorist network, for example, may 
imply an operation is about to be launched (Harrison 2009). In light o f recent attacks, 
however, some law enforcement agencies are now looking beyond this communications 
volume to extract intelligence information from the available data. As an example, the 
New York City Police Department has begun investigating predictive techniques to 
identify an attacker and thwart any plans before they are carried out based on e-mail 
communications and social media services (Tarantola 2012).
We hypothesize that the planning, coordinating, and communicating of attacks in 
this electronic age nearly all make use o f devices capable o f leaving a digital footprint 
that can be monitored, collected, and even analyzed using strategically placed cyber 
sensors. We define a cyber sensor as a physical device, software, or a combination o f the 
two that is capable o f monitoring and recording electronic activity on, between, or among 
digital entities. The data generated by electronic activity on the cyber sensor can then be 
read by an observer or an instrument. Combined with the continuing emergence of sensor 
capabilities, the data produced through cyber sensors provides a tremendous opportunity 
in knowledge discovery, allowing traffic analysis techniques to branch in entirely new 
and innovative directions.
41.2 Contributions of the Dissertation
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. Using data collected from multiple-input cyber sensors, we define a set of objects 
and conditions as part of a model framework based on a homogeneous traffic flow 
model to construct a threat network capable o f predicting malicious intent.
Derived from proven traffic flow theory, we are able to infer a much-needed 
predictive quality to our model framework that, when combined with contextual 
information generated by the model, provides us with a more complete picture of 
the potential threat.
2. We apply classification and clustering techniques to cyber data to derive the basis 
for our framework model and generate much-needed locational and categorical 
information that may be used to better understand and defend against continually 
evolving threats.
3. We validate our test results on real data and map the predicted threats to actual 
event occurrences contained within the data set itself.
4. Rather than viewing our vast and changing digital landscape as an insurmountable 
challenge, we take advantage of and capitalize on the tremendous amount of 
electronic data made available through cyber sensors. Our model framework 
allows us to expand the scope of that found in a traditional traffic analysis model 
to include not only cyber-based systems and the physical infrastructures 
associated with them, but also nearly any type of attack where digital resources 
may be used for the purpose of communication, planning, or coordination of an 
attack.
51.3 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
background information and in traffic analysis and data mining techniques that includes 
classification and clustering methods used in this dissertation. Additionally, we also give 
related research in predictive techniques using Internet-based data such as social media 
services. In Chapter 3, we develop a model framework for a threat network based on 
proven traffic flow theory that is capable of predicting malicious intent. Chapter 4 
addresses threat prediction and identifies the boundary values and conditions that define 
threat prediction phases based on the level o f congestion in the threat network. We also 
describe the contextual threat information provided by the model. In Chapter 5, we 
present two algorithms that describe aggregation in the model framework and processing 
of the threat analysis engine. We give our experimental results in Chapter 6 when our 
model framework is applied to the Reuters-21578 collection (Reuters-21578, Distribution
1.0 1987) o f articles appearing on the Reuters newswire. Conclusions and suggestions for 
future work are provided in Chapter 7 to conclude the dissertation.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
2.1 Traffic Analysis
Signals intelligence, or SIGINT, is defined as intelligence-gathering through the 
interception of signals between people, known as communications intelligence or 
COMINT, electronic signals not directly used in communication, known as electronic 
intelligence or ELINT, or combinations of the two (Signals intelligence 2013). 
Communications intelligence includes the breaking of codes or the monitoring of 
communications traffic (Harrison 2009). As the backbone of communications intelligence 
(Diffie and Landau 2007), Danezis and Troncoso (The Application of Bayesian Inference 
to Traffic Analysis 2008) describe traffic analysis as a family of techniques used to infer 
information from the meta-data o f communications, even when the messages themselves 
cannot be decrypted.
Danezis and Clayton (Danezis and Clayton, Introducing Traffic Analysis 2007) 
write that “traffic data records the time and duration of a communication, and traffic 
analysis examines this data to determine the detailed shape of the communications 
streams, the identities of the parties communicating, and what can be established about 
their locations.” Although Internet data packets are made up of a header and a payload 
component, traffic analysis focuses on the packet header to derive information about user
7behavior based on communication patterns. Unlike the payload component that carries 
the actual data being transmitted, such as a web page or e-mail, the header component is 
used for routing purposes and contains information about the source (i.e., sender) and 
destination (i.e., receiver), length, port numbers, protocol, time stamps, and quality of 
service indicators, among others. Traffic analysis techniques can then be applied to this 
meta-data both individually or aggregated to infer valuable information about a particular 
observed communication, especially if typical communication patterns are known 
(Danezis and Clayton, Introducing Traffic Analysis 2007). From the Wikipedia entry, 
examples o f some of the representative patterns that can be derived from traffic analysis 
include frequent communications (indicative of planning), rapid, short communications 
(indicative of negotiations), and a lack of communication (indicative o f lack o f activity or 
completion of a finalized plan) (Traffic analysis 2013).
2.2 Data Mining Techniques
In this dissertation, we apply the data mining techniques of classification and 
clustering analyses to derive the basis for our threat network and generate contextual 
information regarding a threat potential. In particular, we implement the multinomial 
Naive Bayes classifier as a text classifier within the Waikato Environment for Knowledge 
Analysis (WEKA) environment (Hall, Frank, et al. 2009) to categorize the threat 
potential of text documents extracted from cyber sensors. We also apply the expectation 
maximization (EM) and the simple K-means clustering algorithms on processed 
documents to derive locational information of a threat potential using the WEKA 
platform.
82.2.1 Naive Bayes Classification
Based on the Bayes’ theorem, the Naive Bayes classification is so called because 
of its naive assumption of class conditional independence, such that the effect o f an 
attribute value on a given class is independent of the values o f the other attributes. 
Despite this over-simplified assumption made to reduce the computational costs, the 
Naive Bayes classifier has proven effective in many practical applications, such as text 
classification, where the dimensionality of the input is high (Han and Kamber 2006) 
(Rish 2001).
Using the multinomial Naive Bayes classifier, the probability o f a document 
d being in class q  can be computed as follows in Eq. 2-1:
where P (q )  is the prior probability o f a document occurring in class q  and P ( t fc |q )  is 
the conditional probability of term t k occurring in a document of class q . Since Naive 
Bayes is a supervised machine learning method, we must train the classifier with 
correctly labeled training documents (Kibriya, et al. 2004). We build the vocabulary o f all 
distinct words appearing in all of the documents o f the training set, excluding any 
identified stop words, such as “the”, “a”, or “and”, not considered useful in the 
classification. In a simple bag-of-words model where neither the position nor context of 
words in a document is considered, the words in the vocabulary become the attributes 
used in the text classification. Each document d in the training set then becomes a record 
with frequencies for each word in the vocabulary. The classifier is trained using the 
training data set by computing the prior probabilities for each class q  and the attributes.
Eq. 2-1
These results can then be applied to the test data set to produce the desired classification 
(Han and Kamber 2006).
2.2.2 Clustering Analysis
In this dissertation, we apply two clustering algorithms, EM and simple K-means, 
on a set of Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates to produce locational 
information regarding a threat potential. Specifically, WEKA’s EM clustering algorithm 
is used to determine the optimal number of clusters k  that will serve as input to the 
simple K-means clustering algorithm for the number of clusters to use in grouping a set 
of GPS coordinates.
2.2.2.1 Expectation Maximization Clustering
The EM algorithm is an iterative procedure that computes the maximum 
likelihood estimate (MLE) of the marginal likelihood when there is missing or hidden 
data by iteratively applying the following two processes: the Expectation step, or E-step, 
and the Maximization step, or M-step (Borman 2004).The E-step computes the 
expectation of the log-likelihood function evaluated using the current estimate for the 
parameters. The M-step computes the parameters that maximize the expected value o f the 
log-likelihood function found on the E-step. The E-step and M-step are then repeated 
until convergence of the parameters is achieved (Expectation-maximization algorithm 
2013). Starting with an initial estimate for the missing or hidden data, EM attempts to 
find clusters such that the maximum likelihood of each cluster’s data is obtained.
Through this iterative process, estimates for the missing or hidden data are assigned so as 
to maximize the sample’s probability for an event (Adebisi, Olusayo and Olatunde 2012).
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2.2.2.2 K-means Clustering
As a partitioned clustering approach, K-means clustering classifies a set o f objects 
based on their attributes into K  number of clusters by minimizing the sum of squares of 
distances between the data and the corresponding cluster centroid. Given an initial value 
k  for the number of clusters supplied by the EM clustering algorithm, objects are 
randomly assigned an initial cluster. Based on objects in the cluster, the centroid o f each 
cluster is then recalculated. Using an iterative process, objects are relocated to the most 
similar cluster where similarity is defined as the distance between objects until the 
centroid for each cluster does not change (Lanzi 2007, Trajkovic 2010).
2.3 Related Research
With the proliferation of the Internet, and all of the available electronic data that it 
entails, significant interest is being generated in Internet-based predictive analytics. Data 
from the nearly 400 million new social media posts every day (Temple-Raston 2012) are 
increasingly being used to predict everything from box office and election results to stock 
market trends (Wang, Gerber and Brown, Automatic Crime Prediction using Events 
Extracted from Twitter Posts 2012). Suggesting that social media services such as Twitter 
can be used to predict events before they occur, one area o f preliminary research has also 
detected a correlation between spikes in certain hashtags and subsequent events (Miller 
2011). Using a set of tweets from an area news agency, Wang et al. (Automatic Crime 
Prediction using Events Extracted from Twitter Posts 2012) have been able to use 
automatic semantic analysis, dimensionality reduction, and linear modeling to predict hit- 
and-run incidents. Wang and Brown (The spatio-temporal modeling for criminal 
incidents 2012) propose using spatio-temporal generalized additive models (ST-GAMs)
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on spatial, temporal, geographic, and demographic data from criminal incidents to predict 
future criminal incidents. Wang et al. (Spatio-Temporal Modeling of Criminal Incidents 
Using Geographic, Demographic, and Twitter-derived Information 2012) then combine 
the ST-GAM approach developed in (The spatio-temporal modeling for criminal 
incidents 2 0 1 2 ) with textual analysis to predict the probability of criminal activity at a 
given time and location.
Colbaugh and Glass (Leveraging sociological models for prediction I: Inferring 
adversarial relationships 2 0 1 2 ) suggest that leveraging sociological models in the 
development and implementation of machine learning algorithms applied to empirical 
Web-based data can be effective in predicting the outcomes of a wide range of social 
processes that include political elections, consumer behavior, and the stock market. In 
another work, Colbaugh and Glass (Predictive defense against evolving adversaries 2012) 
propose two predictive defense algorithms against evolving adversaries in several 
domains, including cyber defense, border security, counterterrorism, and fraud 
prevention, that are evaluated using a large collection of non-Spam and Spam e-mails. 
The first approach is based on both game theory and machine learning and serves as the 
basis for synthesizing robust defenses in predicting adversary actions. The second 
extrapolates the evolution of defense system configurations forward in time to generate 
defenses that work well against evolving threats. Usmani et al. (Suicide Bombing 
Forecaster - Novel Techniques to Predict Patterns o f Suicide Bombing in Pakistan 2012) 
present an advanced warning and mitigation system using a distance-based scoring 
measure and KNN density estimation on historical terrorist events collected from media 
reports, hospitals, and the Internet to predict patterns of suicide bombings in Pakistan.
CHAPTER 3
MODEL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Components of the Model Framework
Cyber sensors monitor and collect electronic data from digital sources. We are 
primarily interested in textual data such as that found in websites, blogs, social media 
services, text messages, and e-mails. The data collected at each cyber sensor serve as 
input into the model framework to be analyzed and measured as depicted in Figure 3-1
Cyber Sensors
Clustering
Aggregation
ThreatEngine Analysis
Data Extraction Classification Engine
Threat Prediction 
^  Nature of Threat 
^  Target Location
Location
Extraction
Figure 3-1: Overview o f the model framework for predicting threat potential.
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The derived threat prediction and its associated locational and categorical 
information are output from the framework. The model framework itself is composed of 
four major processing units that include the extraction, data mining, aggregation, and 
threat analysis units, where each unit is made up of one or more individual components.
3.1.1 The Extraction Unit
The extraction unit contains both the data extraction and location extraction
components of the model framework. The data extraction component is responsible for 
obtaining the raw data from cyber sensors while the location extraction component is 
charged with obtaining any embedded locational data from the text content. Cyber 
sensors are placed at strategic points on the network to monitor and record electronic 
activity on, between, or among digital entities on a network. As an example, a cyber 
sensor may be embedded software on network hardware, such as a switch or router, or 
reside on a node, such as a personal computer.
3.1.1.1 The Data Extraction Component
Data from a cyber sensor serve as input to the data extraction component. A data
extraction utility is used to retrieve data from a given cyber sensor and extract its textual 
content either directly or indirectly. When a cyber sensor contains only a reference to the 
data, such as a URL for a website, the data extraction utility uses the reference to extract 
the textual content from that reference location. The data extraction utility retrieves the 
textual data directly from the cyber sensor itself in cases when the cyber sensor records 
the actual text content of the electronic activity. Given the potentially large amount o f 
data that can be continually produced, a data extraction system must be able to efficiently 
collect this data with limited human effort. A filter, such as an IP address, range of IP
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addresses, or even a specific protocol type, may also be applied to reduce the amount of 
data collected. Further, additional content extraction techniques may be used to identify 
the main content areas and remove noisy blocks, such as advertisements, navigation 
panels, copyright notices, and privacy policies, from a document in an effort not only to 
reduce the amount o f data collected, but also to target the most relevant data and improve 
the performance of the model (Liu and Chang 2004).
The textual content is then transformed into an Attribute-Relation File Format 
(ARFF) document for use in the WEKA environment. As an example, data may be 
acquired from a web site using a web content extractor through either a manual or 
automated process referred to as web scraping or web harvesting (Kay 2004) and then 
converted into an ARFF document using the TextDirectoryToArff Java class (ARFF files 
from Text Collections 2009).
3.1.1.2 The Location Extraction Component
The location extraction component is responsible for identifying any locational 
information embedded in the text of each ARFF document processed by the data 
extraction component and then converting each geographic location into a set o f Global 
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates for use in the WEKA environment. We 
accomplish this task in this dissertation through the application of the GeoMaker 
interface (Heilmann 2009) on the ARFF documents.
3.1.2 The Data Mining Unit
The data mining unit contains the classification and clustering components and is 
responsible for performing the machine learning tasks of classifying and clustering ARFF 
documents using the WEKA platform.
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3.1.2.1 The Classification Component
In the classification component, we use the multinomial Naive Bayes classifier to 
categorize the threat potential of each ARFF document. As a supervised machine learning 
method, we must first train the classifier using a training data set. Since we also desire to 
classify the nature o f the threat for each document, we define labels as a set of classes 
that categorize the types o f threat potential that we are interested in classifying. Once one 
or more specific threat types, along with a non-threat type, are identified, we hand- 
classify a key set of training documents containing the labels, or type of threats, that we 
aim to discern. These threat categories are contextual and are based on the environment 
in which they are found. Their level of specificity depends upon the expected outcome 
required by the operation as well as that provided by the type of data we expect.
As an example, given the set o f documents appearing on the Reuters newswire 
known as the Reuters-21578 collection (Reuters-21578, Distribution 1.0 1987), we 
identify the ten general threat types, plus a non-threat type, in Table 3-1 for use in our 
experimental results. The business classifier busi, for example, is used to classify an 
ARFF document as having a business-related threat, such as a hostile corporate takeover 
of a specific business entity.
Table 3-1: Threat types and non-threat type used in 
the classification of the Reuters-21578 collection.
Classifier Type of Threat
busi business
medi medical
fina financial
govt government
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secu security
econ economy
tran transportation
mill military
comp computer
envi environment
none no threat
We employ a simple bag-of-words model, considering only the words contained 
in the documents and not their context nor position, to form our dictionary of the set of 
words used in the classifier, so it is vital that the training set include a set of threat words 
that can act as emotional cues leading to the expected threat.
3.1.2.2 The Clustering Component
In the clustering component, we apply WEKA’s EM clustering algorithm on the 
ARFF document of GPS coordinates to compute the optimal number o f clusters k  that 
will be subsequently used to specify the number o f clusters employed by the simple K- 
means clustering algorithm in WEKA.
3.1.3 The Aggregation Unit
The aggregation unit is composed of the aggregation engine and is responsible for 
aggregating all of the various threat-related data, such as the threat category counters, 
within and among cyber sensors that will eventually be used as input into the threat 
analysis engine.
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3.1.4 The Threat Analysis Unit
The threat analysis engine is ultimately responsible for producing the threat 
prediction itself along with its associated contextual information as part o f a threat 
prediction profile shown in Figure 3-2. Inside the threat analysis engine, we calculate the 
values for each of the indicators used in the threat prediction, set the threat prediction 
state to the applicable phase, and, if a threat potential is identified, establish the probable 
nature of the threat and convert the clusters of GPS coordinates into readable addresses of 
probable target locations.
Threat Prediction Profile
t i m e  s t e p d a t e / t i m e th r e a t  p r e d i c t io n  w in d o w
likelihood nature of threat target location
l ik e l ih o o d  1 .1 c a t e g o r y  1 c a te g o r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 1
lik e l ih o o d  1 1 c a t e g o r y  2 c a te g o r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 .2
i i i i i g t t p l i i g M i
lo c a t io n  l l o c a t io n  p r o b a b i l i t y  1
l ik e l ih o o d  2 .1 c a t e g o r y  1 c a te g o r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  2 .1
l ik e l ih o o d  2 .2 c a t e g o r y  2 c a te g o r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  2 . 2
'
;
'•
lo c a t io n  2 lo c a t io n  p r o b a b i l i t y  2
l ik e l ih o o d  n . l c a t e g o r y  1 c a te g o r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  n . 1
l ik e l ih o o d  n .2 c a t e g o r y  2 c a te g o r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  n .2
’
: ;
lo c a t io n  n l o c a t io n  p r o b a b i l i t y  n
Figure 3-2: Threat prediction profile template output from the threat analysis engine.
3.2 Threat Agents
We apply WEKA’s multinomial Naive Bayes classifier to categorize whether a 
document represents a potential threat and, if the document is classified as having one of 
the identified threat categories, assign a document threat value of y = 0.25 corresponding 
to an increased level of perceived threat potential from that document. The cumulative 
values from all documents for a given cyber sensor evaluated over the measurement 
interval up to and including a value of ymax =  1 . 0 0  will make up the threat indicator 
value assigned for that particular cyber sensor. These values are chosen in this manner to 
intuitively correspond to the threat indicator levels in Table 3-2 adopted from the color- 
coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) created in response to the September 
11 attacks (Homeland Security Advisory System 2013). It should be noted that these 
suggested threat indicator values and corresponding levels may be adjusted according to 
specific requirements or scenarios as needed.
Table 3-2: Threat indicator values 
and their associated levels for each 
cyber sensor during each 
measurement interval.
Threat Indicator
Value Level
0 . 0 0 low
0.25 guarded
0.50 elevated
0.75 high
1 . 0 0 severe
A threat indicator value, denoted s t, is assigned for each cyber sensor i, i = 1,
. . . ,  n, and used to convey a threat potential associated with the collected cyber data in the 
measurement interval such that a higher value corresponds to a larger threat potential. If 
no documents have been classified as having threat potential during a given measurement 
interval for a particular cyber sensor, however, then a threat indicator value s t o f 0 . 0 0  
corresponding to a threat indicator level of low will be assigned. On the other hand, three 
documents classified as having threat potential during a given measurement interval for a 
given cyber sensor would yield a threat indicator value s t o f 0.75 with a threat indicator 
level of high. The aggregation engine will total the threat indicator values across all cyber 
sensors during the given measurement interval and determine the number of threat agents 
present in the threat network for evaluation by the threat analysis engine.
We define a threat agent as a single object on a threat network that is used to 
identify the degree to which a capability or intent exists to manifest a threat based on the 
aggregation of threat indicator values from the set o f cyber sensors over a measurement 
interval. A threat agent is allocated for each unit value accumulated from the sum of 
threat indicator values over the total number o f cyber sensors n  for each measurement 
interval. From the perspective of the traffic flow model, each threat agent corresponds to 
an individual vehicle on a given segment of road at a particular time. The number of 
threat agents N present in a given measurement interval is obtained by rounding the sum 
of the threat indicator values o f the n  cyber sensors as shown in Eq. 3-1 using the round 
half up tie-breaking rule such that decimals that are 0.5 or greater are rounded to the next 
integral value:
N  =
n
X *i=l
20
Eq. 3-1
where st represents the threat indicator value for the ith cyber sensor in the measurement 
interval. For example, |2.25] = 2, but |2.5J =  3 using the round half up tie breaking rule 
for rounding. The maximum number o f threat agents present within a single measurement 
interval corresponds to the total number of n  cyber sensors, each cyber sensor having a 
threat indicator value of Ym ax — 1-00. That is, a threat network having a total of six cyber 
sensors, for example, can have, at most, six threat agents defined during a particular 
measurement interval.
Consider a threat network supporting five cyber sensors. During the measurement 
interval in question, the following threat indicator values s ir i =  1, . . . ,  5, were assigned 
based on the number o f documents associated with each cyber sensor that were classified 
as having threat potential: s t — 0.25, s 2 = 0.75, s3 =  0.00, s4  = 0.75, and s5 = 0.50. 
These values indicate that cyber sensor s± has one document identified as having threat 
potential during the measurement interval, while cyber sensors s2 and s4, for example, 
each have three documents identified as having threat potential during the measurement 
interval. As a result, two threat agents are inserted into the threat network for this 
measurement interval as given by:
5
N  =
. X *
U = 1
= 1(0.25 + 0.75 +  0 . 0 0  +  0.75 +  0.50)J =  (2.25] =  2 .
3.3 Discretization
We construct our framework model using a macroscopic theory of traffic flow 
(Trani 2009) where threat agents are not identified individually, but as a group moving
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through the threat network. For our model, we consider a single homogenized view 
similar to the traffic flow o f vehicles utilizing a single lane of a roadway moving in the 
same direction. Using a numerical approach to derive a solution to our model, we arrange 
our domain into finite volumes through uniform discretization where x  represents the 
spatial coordinate along the threat network and t represents time.
We define the total network length L o f the threat network to be the product o f the 
user-defined segment size m  and the total number o f cyber sensors n, such that L = m  • 
n. We spatially discretize our domain into a finite number /  o f m + 1 points, j  =
0 ,..., m, and divide the threat network into m  uniform grid cells of length Ax so that the 
j th cell is denoted by x;- =  [/Ax, (j +  l)Ax]. Discretization is performed again, this time 
with regards to time, to transform the continuous time model into a discrete time mode by 
dividing the time domain into discrete time steps of duration At with the kth time step 
denoted by t k = [kAt, (k  +  l)At], This space-time discretization is illustrated in Figure
Figure 3-3: Space-time discretization of a threat network showing grid cells on the 
axis of abscissas and time steps on the axis o f ordinates.
3-3.
Ax Ax
4 ---------------   ►
t * * l
t k
t k - l
 >
Xj+1 X
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3.4 Cyber Density, Cyber Velocity, and Cyber Flux
Our approach thus far has been to establish the components of our framework 
model so that the network of threat traffic can be overlaid with traffic flow theory, where 
a threat agent is analogous to a vehicle on a defined road segment. Taking from 
fundamental concepts in traffic flow theory (Metcalf 2006) (Trani 2009) (Tabak 2004), 
where velocity, traffic density, and traffic flux form a large part of the infrastructure used 
to predict the capability or behavior of a road system (Fundamental diagram of traffic 
flow 2 0 1 2 ), we define analogous variables to be used with the threat agents in our model 
framework to aid us in predicting threat potential. Through our earlier discretization, we 
have divided the threat network into m  equal segments, each with length n  corresponding 
to the number of cyber sensors as depicted in Figure 3-4.
m
"  *  *  I i
►H—
i---------------- ,-----------------1----------   »___________ ,___________ _
x=  j
Figure 3-4: Total network length L of the threat network containing m grid cells o f 
uniform length n.
We define cyber velocity v (x , t)  as the measure of the rate o f change of a threat 
agent of its position x  over time t  in a threat network. We restrict the movement o f a 
threat agent to at most one cell in a given time step. Since there can be at most n  threat 
agents inside any given cell, we have a maximum cyber velocity vmax within the threat 
network equivalent to the number of cyber sensors n. The cyber velocity thus identifies 
the movement rate of a threat agent through the threat network. Taking the derivative o f x
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with respect to t, we obtain the rate o f change of a threat agent as =  v (x > 0 -  The
domain of the cyber velocity is [0 , vmax], where vmax =  n.
Since the concept o f a threat agent is abstract, we may assume that all threat 
agents have the same uniform length, so that we can readily define cyber density p(x, t) 
as the measure o f the number o f threat agents per cell at position x  and time t  in a threat 
network. Each grid cell has uniform length Ax given by the number o f cyber sensors n. 
From our earlier definition of the number of threat agents, the cyber density for each cell 
is given by (x, t ) =  ^ • When no threat agents exist in a given cell, we have
Pmin % x  ~  0  , so that p(x, t) >  0. Since we have restricted our maximum number 
of threat agents per cell to be N =  n, by definition, the maximum cyber density is said to 
be pmax = n/n  — 1. Thus, the range of values for the cyber density can be described as 
0 <  p(x, t)  <  1. Now, assuming p  is a continuous function, we can easily see that for 
any grid cell j ,  the number of threat agents N  is simply the integration of the cyber 
density as shown in Eq. 3-2:
We define the cyber flux q(x, t) as the measure of the number o f threat agents that 
pass through position x at time t  in a threat network. We compute the cyber flux to be the 
product o f the cyber density and the cyber velocity as follows:
The number of threat agents present in a particular cell x, can vary due to the flow 
of agents into and out of the cell over time. For an arbitrary grid cell Xj ,  the derivative of
Eq. 3-2
Xi
q ( x ,t ) =  p ( x ,t ) • v (x , t). Eq. 3-3
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the number of threat agents with respect to time is equal to the number of threat agents 
per time step entering cell Xj minus the number of threat agents per time step exiting cell 
Xj. Noting that threat agents exiting cell Xj is equivalent to threat agents entering cell 
Xj+ 1 , we have the following:
dN r \ r ^—  =  q{Xj, t )  -  q(xj+1,t) .  Eq. 3-4
We can now take the derivatives of both sides of Eq. 3-2 as follows:
'7+1
_ d _
d t
X
dN d« f
= d t t)dx . Eq. 3-5
We now combine Eq. 3-4 and Eq. 3-5 to yield the following:
* 7+1
d_
d t J  p(jx, t)d x  =  q(xj, t ) -  q(pcJ+1, t ). Eq. 3-6
Since q(xj, t ) — q(xj+1, t)  =  — [q(xj+1, t ) — q(xj, t)], we take the partial 
derivative o f the right-hand side o f the equation with respect to x, followed by the 
integral from Xj  to Xj+ 1 , and substitute back into Eq. 3-6 to yield:
* 7+ 1  * 7 + 1
d f  f  dq(x , t )
—  I p ( x , t ) d x =  I  —— dx.  Eq. 3-7
X j  X j
Simplifying and combining terms to the left side o f the equation gives Eq. 3-8:
* 7+ 1 //V .  ' d d— p(x,  t)  4- —  q(x,  t)  j dx  =  0. Eq. 3-8
Assuming the integrand is continuous, this can only hold if the integrand itself is 
zero, so we have:
satisfying the global conservation law. Eq. 3-9, however, is a single relation involving 
two unknowns, so we must add another constraint to be able to close the system. Using
Eq. 3-3, we let the cyber flux be defined as a function of both the cyber density and cyber
d dvelocity such that — q(x, t ) becomes — q(p, v).
O X  O X
We can now rewrite Eq. 3-9 as:
d d d
—  p(x, t) + v(x, t) t ) +  p(x, t)  mf a V ( x ,  t) =  0. Eq. 3-10
Making a general observation about traffic flow, we note that when there are little 
to no vehicles on the road, the mean vehicle velocity tends toward the speed limit, 
denoted here as vmax. When there is bumper-to-bumper traffic, however, the mean 
vehicle velocity drops to nearly zero. Applying these observations to our cyber model, we 
express cyber velocity in terms of the cyber density such that v(x,  t) =  v (p(x , t ) )  =
v(p).  Taking the derivative of the cyber velocity with respect to x  such that
0, we cancel out the last term in Eq. 3-10 as follows:
d d
- p ( x , t )  + v ( p ) - — p( x , t )  = 0. Eq. 3-11
Eq. 3-11 is now considered a closed equation for a single variable p that can be 
solved. This conservation equation of the number of threat agents relates the rate o f 
change of the cyber density of threat agents in a segment o f the threat network to the rate 
of threat agents entering and leaving it. If the initial cyber density and the cyber velocity 
field are known, we are able to predict the cyber density at future times. Though we have 
already indicated that the cyber velocity can be expressed as a function of the cyber
dv{p)  j
dx
density, this result leads us to select a specific function for cyber velocity that will be 
used in our model framework to derive the boundary values and conditions that measure 
the level of congestion in our threat network used in predicting threat potential.
CHAPTER 4
THREAT PREDICTION
Our approach to predicting threat potential is straightforward: the more 
congestion we have in our threat network, the more threat potential exists. We, therefore, 
need to identify the boundary values and conditions that comprise the different phases of 
congestion defined in our threat network.
4.1 Boundary Values and Conditions of Interest
Since, given a density, there exists a corresponding velocity from a deterministic 
formula (Wang, et al. 2009), we are able to express cyber velocity as a function of cyber 
density. Intuitively, we suppose that the cyber velocity is at the maximum vmax when the 
cyber density is pmjn. Similarly, we claim that the cyber velocity should be at vmin when 
the cyber density is pmax. Thus, we expect the mean cyber velocity v  to be a decreasing 
function with respect to cyber density p.
Though much effort has been devoted to the formulation of velocity-density 
models that closely approximate empirical observations, the exact relationship between 
velocity and density is still uncertain (Ni 2013). Since similar results can be obtained 
using other models (Kuhne and Michalopoulos 1992), we assume Greenshield’s model 
(Greenshields 1935), which posits a negative linear relationship, for its simplicity as 
given in Eq. 4-1:
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1?(p) V m ax ' f  1 J > 0 — P — P m a x- Eq. 4-1
'  P m a x '
This velocity-density relationship is illustrated graphically in Figure 4-1.
max
Pmax/
max
cyber density
Figure 4-1: Greenshield’s model expressing cyber velocity as a function o f cyber 
density.
Combining Eq. 3-3 and Eq. 4-1, we have the following:
q{p) =  p ■ v{p ) =  ymaa; ■ (p  -  , 0 < p <  pmax. Eq. 4-2
\  P m a x /
Since this is a quadratic equation with a negative second order term, the curve is 
parabolic and concave down. We also expect to have zeros when the cyber density p is at 
pmin and Pmax- Therefore, the cyber flux must have a maximum cyber flow, denoted as 
q*, at a critical cyber density p* between pmln and pmax-
This flux-density relationship can be illustrated graphically as shown in Figure
4- 2 .
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max
max /
max
cyber density
Figure 4-2: Cyber flux expressed as a function of cyber density showing the cyber 
density p* at the maximum cyber flow q*.
To find the cyber density at the maximum cyber flow q*, we differentiate Eq. 4-2 
with respect to p such that:
dq
v ,
2  p- v„
m ax Eq. 4-3
d p  P m ax
Setting Eq. 4-3 to zero and solving for p,  which we identify as p*, we have:
* P m ax  „p =  - y —. Eq. 4-4
Substituting Eq. 4-4 into Eq. 4-1 and solving, we obtain the cyber velocity v* at 
the maximum cyber flow q*:
(Pm“ /2)\ V,= vmax ■ | 1
Pm ax
Eq. 4-5
To derive the maximum cyber flow q*, we substitute Eq. 4-4 into Eq. 4-2 and 
solve to get the following:
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q* = vmax
V-max ' P m ax  
4 Eq. 4-6
4.2 Threat Prediction Phases
Now that we have established key points of interest in our model for each of the 
cyber variables, we now identify three threat prediction phases associated with a level of 
congestion in the threat network and how each of them are used in predicting threat 
potential.
The threat prediction free phase is characterized by a free flow of relatively few
everyday activity. Clearly, when there are no threat agents present in the threat network, 
the cyber density p and cyber flux q are both 0.00, while the cyber velocity v  is vmax. As 
would be expected, these values are indicative of a lack of threat potential. The critical 
cyber density p* and its corresponding values for cyber velocity v* and cyber flux q* are 
key boundary conditions o f the threat prediction free phase, so we use the range of values 
for these cyber variables from when no threat agents are present in the threat network to 
these critical values to identify the threat prediction free phase as shown in Table 4-1. 
Since the cyber flux is not a one-to-one function, we add the condition that p <  p* to 
ensure the correct phase is properly identified.
4.2.1 Threat Prediction Free Phase
threat agents that present little or no threat potential, considered to be a normal flow of
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Table 4-1: Cyber variable boundary values and conditions identifying the threat 
prediction free phase.
Cyber Variables Free Phase Boundary Values and Conditions
Cyber Velocity v m ax2  <  V <  Vm ax
Cyber Density 0  < p  <  p” “
Cyber Flux 0 < q <  ' Pmax), p < p -
4.2.2 Threat Prediction Congested Phase
As more threat agents enter the system, however, we would expect a more 
congested and unstable flow of threat agents that defines the congested phase, indicative 
of a higher threat potential. It is in this phase where a threat potential is considered to be 
significantly probabilistic. Threat-related contextual data generated by the threat analysis 
engine is available in this phase to aid in the understanding o f the threat potential so that 
appropriate measures may be taken to prepare for and guard against the predicted threat.
The congested phase is demarcated from the more severe jammed phase by a 
user-defined jammed threshold constant a  that is given as a percentage value between 
zero and one, inclusively. The jammed threshold constant a  is used to calculate the 
boundary condition values separating the jammed phase from the congested phase as 
shown in Table 4-2. In this phase, we must add the condition that p > p* to ensure the 
correct phase is properly identified for the cyber flux.
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Table 4-2: Cyber variable boundary values and conditions identifying the threat 
prediction congested phase.
Cyber Variables Congested Phase Boundary Values and Conditions
Cyber Velocity (cr • _ Vmax------ -^-----<  V < ——
2  2
Cyber Density Pmax ,  (Pmax\ n
2  < p - \  2  H 2
Cyber Flux (a ' ^max ' Pmax) _ ( ^max ' Pmax) _ .4 s « <  4 ' P > P
4.2.3 Threat Prediction Jammed Phase
The jammed phase is characterized by little or no movement o f threat agents in 
the threat network where threat potential is considered imminent and additional measures 
to counter the threat should be taken immediately. At the top-end of this phase, in the 
fully jammed phase, the cyber velocity v  and cyber flux q are both 0 .0 0 , while the cyber 
density p is pmax, indicative o f no movement at all in the threat network.
Since this phase is directly determined by the jammed threshold constant a, care 
should be taken to define an appropriate value for a  to distinguish the point of being 
prepared to take action (i.e., the threat prediction congested phase) to that when action to 
be taken immediately to defend against an impending threat. A value for a  selected closer 
to one reduces the range of the congestion phase in favor of the jammed phase, while a 
value for a  selected closer to zero reduces the range of the jammed phase and expands 
that o f the congested phase. The boundary values and conditions of the cyber variables 
for the threat prediction jammed phase are shown in Table 4-3. Again, since the cyber
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flux is not a one-to-one function, we add the condition that p > p* to ensure the correct 
phase is properly identified.
Table 4-3: Cyber variable boundary values and conditions identifying the threat 
prediction jammed phase.
Cyber Variables Jammed Phase Boundary Conditions
Cyber Velocity ___ ' V m a x )
2
Cyber Density (—p )  ■ (2 -  a ) <  p <  pmax
Cyber Flux 0 <  q < C“  ' V m a x  ' P m a x > , p > p ‘
The cyber density p  is calculated using the arithmetic mean o f the sum of the 
number of threat agents in the active segment o f the time step being measured, while the 
cyber velocity v  and cyber flux q are calculated as derived in Eq. 4-1 and Eq. 4-2, 
respectively.
4.2.4 Example of Threat Prediction in a Threat Network
Consider the simple example of a threat network shown in Figure 4-3 for some 
time step t k using n  =  6  cyber sensors and a segment size m  = 3 showing five vehicles 
in cell Xy_ 2 , two in x/_1, and four in Xj, where each vehicle in the figure represents a 
single threat agent allocated relative to position Xj for a particular time step t k .
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Figure 4-3: Discretized threat network with n  =  6 cyber sensors using a segment size 
m  =  3 showing five threat agents in cell Xy_2, two in 3 and four in Xj for some 
time step t k .
Arbitrarily choosing a jammed threshold constant a = 0.70, we identify the 
boundary values and conditions for the three threat prediction phases associated with 
each cyber variable as shown in Table 4-4.
Table 4-4: Cyber variable boundary values and conditions for each of the threat 
prediction phases in the given example for n  =  6  cyber sensors when a = 0.70.
Phase Cyber Velocity Cyber Density Cyber Flux
Free 3.000 < v  < 6.000 0.000 < p <  0.500 0.000 < q < 1.500, p < 0.500
Congested 2.100 < v <  3.000 0.500 < p <  0.650 1.050 < q < 1.500, p > 0.500
Jammed 0 . 0 0 0  <17 < 2 . 1 0 0 0.650 < p <  1.000 0.000 < <7 < 1.050, p > 0.500
The cyber density p  for time step t k is calculated as p  = ^  +  ^ ^ j ^ 5  . 3 ) ~
0.611, with the cyber velocity v  =  6  • [ l  — (0-61 l / i ) ]  «  2.333 and the cyber flux
q = 6 1.426. We observe from Table 4-4 that the values of
all three cyber variables are in the range of the congested phase, resulting in a threat 
prediction being made for time step t k . Since this threat prediction is in the congested 
phase, the threat potential is considered significantly probabilistic to the point o f being 
prepared to take action if needed.
Increasing the jammed threshold constant to a = 0.80 would expand the range of 
the jammed phase while at the same time reduce the range o f the congested phase. We 
recalculate the boundary values to account for the new jammed threshold constant value 
a for the three threat prediction phases as shown in Table 4-5.
Table 4-5: Cyber variable boundary values and conditions for each of the threat 
prediction phases in the given example for n  =  6 cyber sensors when a  — 0.80.
Phase Cyber Velocity Cyber Density Cyber Flux
Free 3.000 < v <  6.000 0.000 < p  <0.500 0.000 < q <  1.500, p <  0.500
Congested 2.400 < v  <3.000 0.500 < p < 0.600 1.200 < q <  1.500, p > 0.500
Jammed 0.000 < 17 < 2.400 0.600 < p <  1.000 0.000 < q <  1.200, p > 0.500
As expected, the range of values for each cyber variable in the congested phase 
was significantly reduced. Perhaps more significantly, using our earlier calculations of 
the actual values for each of the cyber variables, we observe that both the cyber velocity 
v  and cyber density p have both been elevated into the jammed phase, indicative of a 
more imminent threat and cause for action.
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4.3 Contextual Threat Information
Our response to any threat potential must also be adaptable in consideration o f 
any technological, political, economic, medical, social, and locational factors. So for each 
time step identified by the model framework as having threat potential, where the threat 
prediction state is either in the congested or jammed phase, we obtain information 
regarding the probable nature of the threat and target location based on the earlier text 
classification results.
4.3.1 Probable Nature of the Threat
The nature o f the threat is a straightforward calculation of the relative frequency 
of each type of threat over the total number o f threats found in the active segment o f the 
time step being measured. This results in each threat classifier being assigned a unique 
probability for the threat prediction.
4.3.2 Probable Target Location
To generate probable target locational information, we must first identify any 
geographical locations contained within the text content o f each document classified as 
having threat potential in the segment of the time step being measured. This is 
accomplished through the application of the GeoMaker interface (Heilmann 2009) that 
will also extract the GPS coordinates for each of these acquired locations. We consider 
multiple occurrences of geographical locations within a document to be statistically 
significant and account for such incidences when the GPS coordinates for the segment 
are aggregated and placed in an ARFF document for use in clustering machine-learning 
schemes in the WEKA environment.
Although we ultimately use WEKA’s simple K-means implementation to 
generate our clusters o f GPS coordinates used to determine the probability o f each 
potential target location, we first apply its EM clustering algorithm to compute the 
optimal number of clusters k  based on cross-validation of the goodness o f the model’s fit 
(Hall, Kmeans with WEKA 2008). Using k  as the number of clusters, we then employ 
the simple K-means algorithm to generate the centroid-based clusters representing the 
mean value for the latitude and longitude of probable target locations. A batch reverse 
geocoding utility, such as that found at www.fmdlatitudeandlongitude.com/batch-reverse- 
geocode/ (Zwiefelhofer 2013) and used in processing our experiment, is then used to 
convert these resulting GPS coordinates into readable addresses. The probability 
associated with each returned location is based on the relative frequency of the number of 
clustered instances over the total number of GPS coordinates found in the active segment 
of the time step being measured.
CHAPTER 5
PROCESSING THE MODEL FRAMEWORK
5.1 Aggregation in the Model Framework
5.1.1 Multinomial Naive Bayes Classifier in WEKA
Textual documents extracted from cyber sensors are transformed into plain text 
ARFF documents using the TextDirectoryToArff Java class (ARFF files from Text 
Collections 2009) that can be used in both the WEKA environment and the GeoMaker 
interface. To prepare the ARFF document for WEKA’s multinomial Naive Bayes 
classifier, we first apply the unsupervised StringToWordVector attribute filter with the 
AlphabeticTokenizer, but do not use a stemming algorithm. We use the filter options to 
output word counts, convert all tokens to lowercase, ignore words in the default stoplist, 
and limit the number of word fields at 5,000.
We then apply the multinomial Naive Bayes classifier using ten-fold cross- 
validation to obtain a label for each document in one of the identified threat types or the 
non-threat type. If the document is classified as having threat potential, we assign a 
document threat value of y  =  0.25 corresponding to an increased level o f perceived 
threat potential from that document and increment the counter for the specific threat 
category by one that will be used in calculating the nature of the threat later in the model 
framework. These threat-related values will be passed on to the aggregation engine.
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5.1.2 Location Information and the GeoMaker Interface
We simultaneously take the text content from the ARFF document and feed it into
the GeoMaker interface to extract any locational information present in the document.
The interface will then convert any embedded geographic locations into their latitude and 
longitude GPS coordinates. Highlighted by the interface, we keep track o f multiple 
occurrences of location information within the text and pass the generated set o f GPS 
coordinates on to the aggregation engine for further processing.
5.1.3 Aggregation o f Cyber Sensor Data
The aggregation engine is responsible for the aggregation of outcomes over all
cyber sensors as well as for each individual cyber sensor. Following the expiration of 
each time step t k , we calculate a threat indicator value s, for each cyber sensor i that is 
the sum of all of the document threat values up to a maximum value o f ymax =  1 . 0 0  
assigned for each document classified with threat potential. We also discard any set of 
GPS coordinates extracted from a document that was not classified as having threat 
potential since we are interested only in those coordinates from documents that play a 
part in the threat prediction.
Collectively, the aggregation engine manages the threat-related data across all 
cyber sensors over m number of time steps from through t k . So upon the
expiration of time step t k, we aggregate the applicable cyber sensor data consisting of the 
threat indicator values, threat category counters, and set of GPS coordinates across all 
cyber sensors for time step t k . Using Eq. 3-1 to total the threat indicator values over all 
cyber sensors, we then calculate the number of threat agents N  associated with each 
segment at a particular time step. We format the aggregated set of latitude and longitude
GPS coordinates as numeric attributes and place them in a plain text ARFF document for 
use in clustering machine-learning schemes in the WEKA environment. The remaining 
aggregated threat agents and threat category counters are sent directly to the threat 
analysis engine for evaluation and interpretation. The preceding development for 
aggregation in the model framework can be summarized by stating the following 
algorithm in Figure 5-1.
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Inputs: document threat values, threat category counters, GPS coordinates 
Outputs: N, threat category counters, ARFF document o f GPS coordinates 
1: Initialize: «- 0
2: At the expiration of each time step t k:
3: for each time step t  = to t k :
4: for each cyber sensor i=  1 to n:
5: for each ARFF document d:
6 : if ( document th reat value =  y ) then
7: if ( Si <  Y m a x)  then
8 : Si  « -  S i + y
9: end if
10: else
11: Discard set o f GPS coordinates extracted from ARFF
document.
12: end if
13: end for
14: Aggregate sh threat category counters, and GPS coordinates.
15: end for
16: Calculate threat agents N  «- L£f=i s j .
17: Aggregate threat agents N, threat category counters, and GPS coordinates.
18: end for
Figure 5-1: Aggregation in the Model Framework.
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5.2 Processing of the Threat Analysis Engine
5.2.1 EM and Simple K-means Clustering in WEKA
Textual We then apply the EM clustering algorithm using default parameters in 
WEKA on the ARFF document of GPS coordinates to acquire an optimal value k  for the 
number of clusters used in the ensuing simple K-means clustering algorithm that 
ultimately yields the centroid-based clusters of GPS coordinates of along with their 
respective relative frequencies. This set of k  GPS coordinates and their associated 
probabilities are sent to the threat analysis engine where they will be used to provide the 
locational information portion of the threat prediction.
5.2.2 Threat Prediction in the Threat Analysis Engine
The threat analysis engine is responsible for producing the threat prediction and 
the corresponding locational and categorical information that is used to better understand 
and defend against evolving threats for each time step t k . The threat potential is predicted 
using three cyber variables that include the cyber density, cyber velocity, and cyber flux. 
The threat analysis engine calculates the cyber density p using the aggregated value of 
threat agents N over m  segments divided by the product o f the segment size m  and the 
number of cyber sensors n. The cyber velocity v  and cyber flux q are subsequently 
calculated using the value of the cyber density p in Eq. 4-1 and Eq. 4-2, respectively. 
These values are then compared to the boundary condition values for each of the cyber 
variables to identify which phase each cyber variable state is assigned. We assert that this 
model framework is capable of predicting malicious intent. That is, if  any o f the cyber 
variable states are found to be in either the congested phase or the jammed phase 
indicative of the presence of higher threat potential, we make a threat prediction for the
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immediately following time steps and proceed to determine categorical and locational 
information regarding the threat prediction.
For a predicted threat, we use the aggregated threat category counters to calculate 
the relative frequency of each threat category for time steps to t k to determine
the probable nature of the threat. Similarly, we feed the set o f k  GPS coordinates that 
were generated for time steps to t k into a batch reverse geocoding utility where
they are converted into readable addresses that represent the probable target locations 
when combined with their relative frequencies from the clustering results. The algorithm 
in Figure 5-2 describes the process of predicting a threat in the threat analysis engine.
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Inputs: N, threat category counters, set of k  GPS coordinates and relative frequencies 
Outputs: threat prediction, probable nature of threat and target locations 
1 : Initialize: threat prediction «- fa lse
2: Calculate boundary condition values for all cyber variables using user-defined 
jammed threshold constant a.
3: At the expiration of each time step t k :
4: Calculate cyber density p (N / ( m - n )).
5: Calculate cyber velocity v  <- vmax • [1 -  (p /p majc)].
6 : Calculate cyber flux q <- vmax ■ [p — (p 2 /  pmax)]-
7: for each cyber variable p, v, and q:
8 : Compare with boundary condition values and set to applicable cyber
variable phase £ { free , congested, ja m m e d }.
9: if ( cyber variable in congested or jam m ed  phase ) then
1 0 : threat prediction «- true
11: end if
12: end for
13: if ( threat prediction )
14: Calculate relative frequency for each threat category for time steps
t k - ( m - 1) t0 t k
15: Apply batch reverse geocoding to set o f k  GPS coordinates.
16: end if
Figure 5-2: Process of Predicting a Threat in Threat Analysis Engine.
5.3 Measure of Likelihood
When a threat prediction is made, we combine all o f the information generated by 
the threat analysis engine to create a threat prediction profile that includes the likelihood 
of each type o f threat at each probable location. We calculate the measure o f likelihood A 
of each threat potential based on a scale of zero to ten, with zero being extremely unlikely 
and ten being extremely likely, using the product of the location and nature o f the threat 
probabilities, PiOCation an^ Pnatures respectively, given by their relative frequencies.
Since PiOCation ‘ Pnature — we introduce the following discrete piecewise scaling 
function /? that is based on the positive number of clusters k  found during the application 
of WEKA’s EM clustering algorithm:
where k  is an integral value greater than or equal to one, Amax = 10, and co = 40 based 
on experimental results. As the number of clusters k  increases, we expect that the 
probability PiOCation associated with each target location will potentially decrease as the 
relative frequency is distributed, though perhaps unevenly, across all probable target 
locations. Thus, our scaling function is an increasing function as seen in Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-3: Graph of discrete piecewise scaling function /?(jc) used in the calculation 
of each threat potential likelihood A.
The likelihood A o f each threat potential event can then be given by the following 
rounding the function of the products of the scaling function /? given by Eq. 5-1 using the 
round half up tie-breaking rule, the location probability P;ocatIon, and the nature o f the 
threat probability Pnature as follows:
^  ~  \fi ' Plocation " ^nature\> Eq. 5-2
where 0 <  A < 10. If the scaling function /? causes the value of A to exceed ten, we 
simply assign the maximum value A =  10, indicative that the threat potential is extremely 
likely.
Consider the simple example where upon applying WEKA’s EM clustering 
algorithm, we have identified k  =  6  clusters for use with eight threat categories to 
calculate the measure of likelihood A. For brevity, we focus only on one of the six target 
location probabilities and two of the eight threat categories in our calculations for this
example. Suppose we have calculated the probability for the first location Piocation 1 = 
0.185. Further, we have determined the probabilities for the first and second threat 
categories to be Pnature 1 =  0.424 and Pnature 2 =  0.151, respectively. Since K  = 6 , we 
have as our scaling function /?(6 ) =  40 • ln (6 ) *  71.670. With this information we are 
in a position to calculate the measure o f likelihood for the first threat category at the first 
location as follows:
■^1, 1 ~  1/^(6) ' Piocation 1 ' Pnature lJ
«  1.71.670 ■ 0.185 • 0.424J »  [5.622J =  6 , 
where the subscripts on the measure o f likelihood refer to the instance o f the location and 
threat category, respectively. We now calculate the measure o f  likelihood for the second 
threat category at the first location as follows:
■^1, 2 W( 6)  ’ Piocation 1 " Pnature 2.1
*  [71.670 ■ 0.185 ■ 0.151J »  [2 .0 0 2 J =  2 .
Thus, according to our measure o f likelihood, we state that the likelihood of the 
first type of threat occurring at the first location is somewhat likely, but more likely than 
the second type of threat occurring at the first location, which is not very likely.
CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.1 The Reuters-21578 Collection
In our experiment, we use Distribution 1.0 of the Reuters-21578 text 
categorization test collection (Reuters-21578, Distribution 1.0 1987) to evaluate the 
techniques identified in this dissertation. In lieu of a publicly available textual data set 
from a real adversarial attack, we choose the Reuters-21578 collection since it possesses 
the type of textual web-based content we might find in browsing websites today using a 
smartphone or traditional computer. Additionally, this data set contains instances of 
known attacks, such as a hostile corporate takeover or military strike, so that predicted 
threats may be validated using the data set itself. This data set consists of a collection of 
documents that appeared on the Reuters’ newswire over a period of nine months in 1987 
involving current news from around the world in business, politics, entertainment, and 
several other key areas where threat potential exists. Additionally, these data contain a 
time component that matches up well with the discretized time steps assumed by the 
model that can then be tied to real events for the validation of the results.
The experiment is carried out primarily using the Waikato Environment for 
Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) machine learning tool, utilizing multinomial Naive Bayes 
classification as well as EM and simple K-means clustering machine-learning schemes.
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We identify a set of ten threat types that we use in the classification and create a training 
set of 924 documents by manually classifying each instance as either one of these threat 
types or as a non-threat based on its perceived threat context. The ten threat types, plus 
the non-threat type, for this experiment are identified in Table 3-1 found earlier in 
CHAPTER 3 of this dissertation.
As an example, for this particular experiment, a news article about one country’s 
military strike against another represents a threat potential in the given context of this 
collection of documents whose nature of threat lies in the military (mili classifier) 
domain. We apply a multinomial Naive Bayes machine-learning scheme to our test data 
set of 19,083 documents using the dictionary generated from our training data set and 
import these results into our model framework where each document classified as having 
one of the ten identified threat types is assigned a document threat value of y  =  0.25. For 
this experiment we set up our model framework using four cyber sensors as might 
potentially be used to collect cyber data from a smartphone, a laptop computer, and a 
desktop computer at both a home and work location. Since this data set is not dynamic, as 
would be seen in real-time conditions, we allocate four documents per sensor in each of 
the resulting 1,193 time steps. At the end of each time step, the threat indicator values for 
each cyber sensor are aggregated to determine the number of threat agents. Using a 
segment size m = 4 and a jammed threshold constant a = 0.65, we calculate the cyber 
velocity v, cyber density p, and cyber flux q values over the segment length for each of 
the time steps and identify the corresponding phase states based on the boundary values 
and conditions calculated in Table 6-1.
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Table 6-1: Cyber variable boundary values and conditions for each of the threat 
prediction phases in the experimental results for n =  4 cyber sensors when a  — 0.65.
Phase Cyber Velocity Cyber Density Cyber Flux
Free 2.000 < v  < 4.000 0.000 < p <  0.500 0 . 0 0 0  < q  < 1 .0 0 0 , p <  0.500
Congested 1.300 < v <  2.000 0.500 < p <  0.675 0.650 < q <  1.000, p > 0.500
Jammed 0.000 < v  < 1.300 0.675 < p <  1.000 0.000 < q < 0.650, 
p > 0.500
6.2 Resulting Predictions of Threat Potential
A comparison of the boundary condition values with the calculated values for the 
cyber density, cyber velocity, and cyber flux reveal four distinct periods o f threat 
potential where all three cyber variables simultaneously enter the congested phase that is 
indicative o f the existence of threat potential. We summarize these results numerically in 
Table 6-2, identifying the threat predictions and their corresponding time information.
Table 6-2: Threat prediction results of time-stepped cyber variables for the Reuters- 
21578 collection.
time calculated values phase states
date step velocity density flux velocity density flux
3/16/87 698 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
3/23/87. • • - .. 464 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
-3'23<87 465 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
*3/30(87 609 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
1 2  S ’ 958 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
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1 2 - S-1 959 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
4/28/87 960 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
4/28/87 961 1.750 0.563 0.984 congested congested congested
4/29/87 962 1.500 0.625 0.938 congested congested congested
4/29/87 963 1.500 0.625 0.938 congested congested congested
4/29/87 964 1.500 0.625 0.938 congested congested congested
The charts in Figure 6-1 show the graphical results o f the time-stepped cyber 
variables for the Reuters-21578 collection between the months of February and October 
during the year 1987. The boundary condition values for the congested and jammed 
phase states are plotted as horizontal lines to provide a reference when the cyber variables 
enter and exit these phases.
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Figure 6-1: Time-stepped (a) cyber velocity, (b) cyber density, and (c) cyber flux 
values and corresponding boundary condition values for the Reuters-21578 collection.
The four periods of threat potential are clearly evidenced in Figure 6-1 (a) where 
the graph of the cyber velocity drops below the horizontal graph of the cyber velocity 
congestion phase at these four different time periods, but fails to reach the jammed phase.
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We also observe in Figure 6-1 (b) that the graph of the cyber density peaked above the 
horizontal graph of the cyber density congestion phase during these same time periods. 
Although these periods o f threat potential are not as clearly visible in the graph of the 
cyber flux in Figure 6-1 (c) due to the additional condition that the cyber density p be 
greater than 0.500 for the cyber flux to enter the congested phase, the cyber flux did 
indeed enter the congestion phase during these same periods as noted by the highlighted 
areas of the figure.
Decreasing the jammed threshold constant a  to a lower value has no effect on the 
threat predictions. If the expected data merited a higher value for the jammed threshold 
constant a, however, increasing this constant to a  =  0.80 or higher triggers both the 
cyber velocity and cyber density variables to enter the jammed phase during a portion of 
the last of the four threat prediction periods identified. As a result, this elevated state 
would signify that immediate action is required to guard against the impending threat.
6.3 Probable Nature of the Threat
For each time step in each of the four threat prediction periods, we wish to 
provide contextual data to better understand and defend against the potential threats.
Thus, we calculate the relative frequencies o f each type of threat over the total number of 
threats found in the segment of that particular time step. These results that are 
summarized in Table 6-3 provide us with the probabilities for each nature o f the threat 
for each threat potential at its corresponding time step. Note that the security (secu) and 
computer (comp) fields were removed from Table 6-3 since all column entries for each 
classifier were zero and had no impact on the threat prediction.
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Table 6-3: Nature of threat probabilities for identified time steps o f threat 
potential.
time N ature of T hreat Probabilities
date step fina govt busi econ tran mili envi medi
3/16/1987 298 0.314 0.086 0.057 0.486 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.000
1/23/1987 464 0.424 0 . 1 2 1 0.030 0333 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
3,231987 465 0.324 0.088 0.059 0.412 0.000 0.088 0.029 0.000
3/30/1987 609 0.056 0.250 0.028 0.556 0.028 0.083 0.000 0.000
4/27/1987 958 0.257 0.029 0.057 0.543 0.000 0.029 0.057 0.029
4 iw 7 959 0.343 0.057 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.029 0.057 0.000
4/28/1987 960 0.429 0.086 0.000 0.371 0.000 0.029 0.086 0.000
4/28 l ‘/87 961 0.382 0.118 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.000
4/29/1987 962 0.289 0.132 0.000 0.553 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000
4/29/1987 963 0 . 2 1 1 0.105 0.026 0.632 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000
4/29/1987 964 0.108 0.135 0.027 0.730 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6.4 Probable T arget Locations
We now attempt to identify the probable target locations associated with each 
time step in the four threat prediction periods. The first threat prediction period occurred 
at time step 298, corresponding to the calendar date March 16, 1987. We employ 
GeoMaker to find and analyze embedded geographical locations from each of the 
documents classified as having threat potential in the segment window o f this time step. 
We extract the GPS coordinates for each of the found locations and keep track of 
multiple occurrences to ensure the proper weighting of these locations in the clustering 
machine-learning scheme. Next, we use WEKA’s EM clustering implementation to
55
determine the optimal number o f clusters k  that can subsequently used in WEKA’s 
simple K-means clustering algorithm to yield centroid-based clusters representing the 
mean value latitude and longitude GPS coordinates of the k  probable target locations. For 
time step 298, these k  clusters result in the 11 target locations along with their relative 
frequencies given in Table 6-4. For privacy reasons, however, the actual latitude and 
longitude GPS coordinates are not displayed and their corresponding readable addresses 
are identified only by state, if available, and country. Those GPS coordinates that could 
not be converted into readable addresses appear as an empty, or blank, location cell in the 
table.
Table 6-4: Target location probabilities for threat prediction 
identified in time step 298.
time step: 298 date: 03/16/1987
-  t ' -  *
cluster# instances probability location
0 9 0.037 Russia
1 7 0.029
2 32 0.131 Colombia
3 19 0.078 Gabon
4 5 0 . 0 2 0 Uruguay
5 25 0 . 1 0 2 TX, USA
6 1 0 0.041 Taiwan
7 52 0.213 France
8 14 0.057 Philippines
9 2 2 0.090 MI, USA
1 0 49 0 . 2 0 1 Saudi Arabia
Total: 244
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The second threat prediction period was identified at time steps 464 and 465 that 
correspond to the calendar date March 23, 1987. Repeating the process used for time step 
298, we identify 12 and nine probable target locations for time steps 464 and 465, 
respectively, in Table 6-5.
Table 6-5: Target location probabilities for threat prediction 
identified in time steps 464 and 465.
time step: 464 date: 03 21/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 12 0.047
1 47 0.185
2 16 0.063 Brazil
3 21 0.083 Bolivia
4 39 0.154 Iran
5 47 0.185 OK, USA
6 3 0.012 Zimbabwe
7 10 0.039
8 16 0.063 MD, USA
9 19 0.075 Croatia
10 17 0.067 Belgium
11 7 0.028 Nigeria
Total: 254
time step: 465 date: 03'23/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 62 0.245 MS, USA
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1 14 0.055
2 18 0.071 Australia
3 41 0.162 Brazil
4 10 0.040 Indonesia
5 20 0.079
6 18 0.071
7 18 0.071 Belgium
8 52 0.206 Saudi Arabia
Total: 253
The third threat prediction period was identified at time step 609 that corresponds 
to the calendar date March 30, 1987. Repeating the process again, we identify nine 
probable target locations for time step 609 in Table 6-6. During this time step, we 
observe a significant increase in the number of documents classified as having threat 
potential from approximately 250 in the previous two threat prediction periods to over 
300 in the current one.
Table 6-6: Target location probabilities for threat prediction 
identified in time step 609.
time step: fid9 date: 03/30/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 71 0.231
1 69 0.224 TN, USA
2 20 0.065 Greece
3 25 0.081
4 8 0.026 Philippines
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5 27 0.088 Turkey
6 11 0.036 Namibia
7 30 0.097 Belgium
8 47 0.153 Saudi Arabia
Total: 308
The fourth and last identified threat prediction period in this data set occurred 
over time steps 958 through 964 corresponding to the calendar dates from April 27, 1987, 
through April 29, 1987. With the exception of time steps 961 and 963 that identified five 
and seven probable target locations, respectively, all other time steps were found to have 
only two probable target locations as shown in Table 6-7.
Table 6-7: Target location probabilities for threat prediction 
identified in time steps 958 through 964.
time step: date: 04/27/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 163 0.591 China
1 113 0.409
Total: 276
time step: 959 date: 04/27/1987*• It ' '
cluster# instances probability location
0 177 0.594 China
1 1 2 1 0.406
Total: 298
time step: 960 ; ? *, - date: 04/28/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 169 0.593 China
1 116 0.407
Total: 285
time step: 961 date: 04/28/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 33 0.119 Brazil
1 1 0 0 0.361
2 17 0.061
3 43 0.155 Burma
4 84 0.303 MO, USA
Total: 277
time step: 962 date: 04/29/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 163 0.529 China
1 145 0.471
Total: 308
time step: 963 date: 04/29/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 69 0.259 MO, USA
1 9 0.034 Canada
2 93 0.350 Japan
3 27 0 . 1 0 2 Cambodia
4 1 2 0.045
60
5 44 0.165 Germany
6 1 2 0.045 Iran
Total: 266
time step: 964 date: 04/29/1987
cluster# instances probability location
0 108 0.427
1 145 0.573
Total: 253
6.5 Threat Prediction Profile and Validation of Results
Having a more complete picture of each identified threat potential with its 
probable nature of threats and target locations, we evaluate the results for each time step 
in each of the four threat prediction periods. We take a look at the threat prediction 
profile generated by the model framework and attempt to validate these predictions 
against actual news items appearing within a threat prediction window contained in the 
data set itself. Due to the daily granularity of the data set and the predictive quality o f the 
model, the focus of our prediction window is the days immediately following the 
predicted threat. A sample of the threat prediction profile for the first two location entries 
in time step 298 that corresponds to calendar date March 16, 1987, is presented with the 
classification results and interpretive remarks for the threat prediction window from 
March 17, 1987, to March 22, 1987, in Table 6-8. For the complete detailed table for 
time step 298, refer to Table B -l in Appendix B.
Table 6-8: Threat prediction profile with contextual information for the first two location entries validated against actual news items 
appearing in the Reuters-21578 collection for time step 298.
time step: 298 date: 03/16/1987 threat prediction window: 03/17/1987 to 03/22/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
6 fina 0.314 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
2 govt 0.086
S-I
1 govt 0.071
Government threat includes U.S. opposition to 
Japanese takeover bid of a French-controlled 
corporation.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0  • secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
' 1 busi 0.057 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
ID econ 0.48^
France 0.213
1 2 econ 0.857
Economic threats include concerns mainly over 
farm subsidies, especially for sugar crops, and 
economic reflation; additional threats include 
complaints that the European airliner is being 
unfairly subsidized and a ban on French vessels 
from Canadian fishing ports.
07 tran 0 . 0 0 0 I l i l i l l 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.029 l l f i i i 0. ■ mili ' 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 l i i i t l comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
1 envi 0.029 I 1I 8H I S emi 0.071
Environmental threat includes dormancy of 
winter grains in France.
••• 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 l l l i l medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
6 fina 0.314 i fina 0 . 2 0 0
Financial threat includes the negotiation of the 
delicate balance between western style banking 
and the Islamic legal system.
2 govt 0.086 i govt 0 . 2 0 0
Government threat includes the release of a 
kidnapped Saudi Arabian diplomat after 64 
days of captivity.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
9 econ 0.486
Saudi Arabia 0 .2 0 1
3 econ 0.600
Economic threats include concerns for the 
recovery of the Saudi Arabian economy and the 
ending of the Iraq-Iran war.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
1 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
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In time step 298 we expect the nature o f this threat to be mostly economic 
(48.6%) or financial (31.4%) in nature. Similarly, the most probable target locations of 
threat potential are France (21.3%) and Saudi Arabia (20.1%). During the prediction 
window, we observe that France appeared in 58 unique documents, 12 of which were 
classified to hold an economic threat. Additionally, Saudi Arabia appeared in ten unique 
documents with three economic and one financial threat potentials identified.
Since our goal, however, is to uncover any specific threat potential identified by 
the model framework, we focus our attention to those threat potentials with the highest 
likelihood. We use the product of the jammed threshold constant a and the likelihood 
maximum value as an evaluation metric and consider those items that meet or exceed this 
value as likely potential threats. Given that the jammed threshold constant a  used is 0.65, 
the only threat potential items that satisfy this metric include an economic threat in 
France and another economic threat in Saudi Arabia, having likelihood values o f ten and 
nine, respectively.
Consistent with our algorithmic expectation, economic threats accounted for 
approximately 85.7% of all identified threat potentials in France within the threat 
prediction window. Though several different economic threats were found, concerns over 
farm subsidies, especially sugar crops, and economic reflation had significantly more 
occurrences than the other identified economic threats in France. In Saudi Arabia, 
economic threats accounted for 60.0% o f all identified threat potentials occurring in the 
threat prediction window. Specifically, economic threats in Saudi Arabia focused on the 
recovery of the Saudi Arabian economy amidst falling oil prices.
Additionally, items that fall just below the evaluation metric or whose measure of 
likelihood is trending upwards in successive time steps should be examined for their 
threat potential. In time step 298, financial threats in France and Saudi Arabia and an 
economic threat in Colombia each have a likelihood value o f six. Although no financial 
threats were found in France during the threat prediction window, a financial threat in 
Saudi Arabia involved potential conflicts between western style banking and the Islamic 
legal system, especially in the context of a struggling Saudi Arabian economy. Economic 
threats accounting for approximately 85.7% of the threat potentials identified in 
Colombia inside the threat prediction window include concerns over the impact o f falling 
coffee prices and an unstable sugar market.
A sample o f the threat prediction profile for the first two readable location entries 
in time step 464 that corresponds to calendar date March 23, 1987, is now presented with 
the classification results and interpretive remarks for the threat prediction window from 
March 24, 1987, to March 29, 1987, in Table 6-9. For the complete detailed table for 
time step 464, refer to Table B-2 in the Appendix B.
Table 6-9: Threat prediction profile with contextual information for the first two readable location entries validated against actual 
news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 collection for time step 464.
lime stip: 4t>4 date: 03-23/1987 threat prediction window 03/24/1987 to 03/29/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
8 fina 0.424 1 fina 0.500
Financial threat includes strong winter storm 
centered in Oklahoma spreading snow across 
region.
2 govt 0 .1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.030 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
6 econ 0.333 OK, USA 0.185 1 econ 0.500 Economic threat includes request by U.S. for Japan to lift beef import restrictions.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
O s
6 fina 0.424 t  1 firia 0.063
Financial threat includes revised banking secrecy 
laws for Swiss banks stemming from controversial 
use of Swiss accounts in U.S. arms-for-Iran 
scandal.
',2 govt 0 .1 2 1
1
5
m s m t
govt 0.313
Government threats include issues surrounding the 
sale of arms to Iran, the U.S. offer of warships to 
^escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf, and 
Tunisia's decision to break diplomatic relations 
with Iran.
M W secu 0 . 0 0 0 I) secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.030 P il f lS i l i l lS I !1 | « l l H i ! busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
■ k/5 econ 0.333,, Iran 0.154 2
. ; , : . . .
ccon 0.125
Economic threats include the U.S. offer of 
warships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf 
against Iranian anti-ship missiles and re-opening 
of an offshore oilfield in the Gulf once anti-aircraft 
defenses ready.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 i i i i i s i i s i s i i l i j l l Iran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 - mili 0.091
w •
8 mili 0.500
Military threats include Iran's protective stance on 
shipping traffic in the Gulf, the U.S. offer of 
warships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf, 
and the attack of a supertanker and four Iranian oil 
sites by Iraq.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 ■ 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
SS! • ■
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0
Sit
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
With the exception of the top probable target location in time step 464 that could 
not be converted to a readable address from its GPS coordinates, the model identified two 
other significant probable locations of threat potential in the state o f Oklahoma (18.5%) 
and Iran (15.4%). We expect the type of the threat to be mostly financial (42.4%) or 
economic (33.3%) in nature, although government (12.1%) and military (9.1%) threat 
potentials appear to play a part in this threat prediction as well. During the threat 
prediction window, the state of Oklahoma appeared in only five documents, with one 
financial and one economic threat potential identified.
It should be noted, however, that during this time frame approximately 500 
unique documents were found to contain the United States location in general whose 
readable address translated from its extracted GPS coordinates corresponds to the 
geographic center of the contiguous United States in the state o f Kansas (Geographic 
center of the contiguous United States 2013), close in proximity to the state o f Oklahoma. 
Roughly one-third of these documents were classified as having threat potential, with 
47.6% economic, 18.7% financial, and 16.9% business in nature. Given the statistical 
significance of the proximity o f the readable address to Oklahoma and the number of 
threat-related documents in the threat prediction window, we suppose that the threat 
potential in Oklahoma actually stems from an overall threat potential in the United States 
as a whole. Additionally, we observe that the state o f Maryland (6.3%) also appears as a 
probable target location, yet no threat-related documents were found in the threat 
prediction window that included Maryland. Because o f its close proximity to the nation’s 
capital, we presume that this target location is also the result o f a threat potential in the 
United States in general.
Two threat potentials falling just below the evaluation metric include an economic 
threat in the state o f Oklahoma and a financial threat in Iran. Although we suppose that 
the economic threat in Oklahoma is actually meant for the United States in general, one 
document specific to Oklahoma was found in the threat prediction window involving 
strained trade relations between the U.S. and Japan, an issue that would become more 
intense with each passing day. The financial threat found in Iran during this time frame 
involves the revision of banking secrecy laws stemming from the U.S. arms-for-Iran 
scandal, but is really just part of a growing threat in Iran as evidenced by the non-zero 
entries for Iran in the threat prediction profile. During this threat prediction window, we 
observe that Iran appeared in 16 unique documents, all of which were classified as having 
threat potential. O f these, eight documents were classified as having a military threat 
potential while five others were categorized with a government nature o f threat, perhaps 
suggesting a possible rationale for the increase in the nature o f the threat in these two 
areas predicted by the model framework. Of particular interest here is that during this 
threat prediction window, Iran acquired and test-fired a Silkworm anti-shipping missile in 
the Strait o f Hormuz. Additionally, according to one document in the Reuters-21578 
collection during this time period, the Tunisian news agency TAP asserted that Iran is 
“engaged in activities liable to disturb public order. These included acts aimed at sowing 
ideological confusion and anarchy, the communique said (Reuters-21578, Distribution
1.0 1987).”
A sample o f the threat prediction profile for the first two location entries in time 
step 465 that also corresponds to calendar date March 23, 1987, is now presented with the 
classification results and interpretive remarks for the threat prediction window from
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March 24, 1987, to March 29, 1987, in Table 6-10. For the complete detailed table for 
time step 465, refer to Table B-3 in the Appendix B.
Table 6-10: Threat prediction profile with contextual information for the first two location entries validated against actual news 
items appearing in the Reuters-21578 collection for time step 465.
time step: 465 date: 03 23 1987 threat prediction window: 03/24/1987 to 03/29/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
7 fina 0.324 2 lina 1 .0 0 0
Financial threats include strong winter storm 
-across region and acquisition strategies amidst 
federal regulatory changes in the banking 
industry.
;;  2 govt 0  088 0 govt - 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
- 1 busi 0.059 S l i p ! 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
.. 9 econ 0.412 MS, USA 0.245 lliUll econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
’ 0  - tran. 0 . 0 0 0 I tiS III 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
; 2 . mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
- .. o • comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
l i l i g ® envi 0.029 0 cn\i 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 .0 0 0 . 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
6 fina 0.324 1 fina 1 . 0 0 0 Financial threat includes concerns surrounding the devaluation of Sudan currency.
2 govt 0.088 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.059 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
7 econ 0.412 Saudi Arabia 0.206 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
1 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
Following immediately after time step 464, the nature of threat predicted for time 
step 465 continued in the similar fashion, except that economic (41.2%) threats weighed 
more heavily than financial (32.4%) threats. Similarly, the top two probable target 
locations shifted slightly from the state of Oklahoma to Mississippi (24.5%) and from 
Iran to Saudi Arabia (20.6%). Given that only two documents containing Mississippi 
were classified as having threat potential in the threat prediction window, we again 
suppose that the threat potential identified here is mean for the United States in general, 
especially since the state o f Maryland no longer appears in the threat prediction profile 
and was probably absorbed into the same cluster so that the cluster centroid moved 
easterly from Oklahoma to Mississippi as a result. Although Saudi Arabia appeared in six 
unique documents, only one financial threat potential was identified. The countries of 
Kuwait and Iraq also appeared in several documents during this threat prediction window 
with all documents being classified as having a threat potential. Given the close 
proximity of these countries in the Middle East, we expect that this predicted threat lies in 
the tensions surrounding Iran that were described for time step 464.
Viewing the sequential time steps together, we should also examine any measure 
of likelihood trending upward for their threat potential. We observe a significant increase 
in these values for Brazil in the successive time step with the latter values falling just 
below the evaluation metric. In particular, the probable target location for Brazil 
increased from 6.3% in time step 464 to 16.2% in time step 465, indicative of growing 
threat potential. During the threat prediction window, Brazil appeared in 45 unique 
documents, 15 of which were predicted to hold an economic threat potential with 25 
others identified as being financial in nature. In fact, a national strike of a majority of
Brazil’s 700,000 employees in the banking industry began just one day following the 
threat prediction with no immediate solution in sight (Reuters-21578, Distribution 1.0 
1987). Indicative of the widespread scope of the problem, another document found in the 
data set during the threat prediction window stated that “Brazil’s labour unrest is 
spreading, with many banks, universities and government statistical offices on strike and 
more pay disputes looming” (Reuters-21578, Distribution 1.0 1987).
A sample of the threat prediction profile for the first two readable location entries 
in time step 609 that also corresponds to calendar date March 30,1987, is now presented 
with the classification results and interpretive remarks for the threat prediction window 
from March 31, 1987, to April 6 , 1987, in Table 6-11. For the complete detailed table for 
time step 609, refer to Table B-4 in the Appendix B.
Table 6-11: Threat prediction profile with contextual information for the first two readable location entries validated against actual 
news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 collection for time step 609.
- - Time stei^OtJ^^filate: 03-30'1987 thie.it piediction window: <13 ’ 1 1 4  im ‘is-
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
1 fina 0.056 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
5 govt 0.250 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.028 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
1 0 econ 0.556
TN, USA 0.224
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
1 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.083 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
fina (Mi?n SaudiArabia 0.153 . 1, fina 1 .0 0 0
Financial threats include terms of aid promised to 
Senegal over next three years.
3 govt. 0.250
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0
'-0 ■ busi 0.028
. . . .
i i n m i i econ 0.556
0 tran 0.028
;; 1 mili 0.083
A ° \ comp 0 . 0 0 0
.  0 envi 0 . 0 0 0
. 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0
g o \ t 0 000 No government threats found.
secu 0.000 No security threats found.
busi 0.000 No business threats found.
econ 0.000 No economic threats found.
tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
mill 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found;
comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
modi 0.000 No medical threats found;
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With the exception of the top probable target location in time step 609 that could 
not be converted into a readable address from its GPS coordinates, the model identified 
two other significant probable locations o f threat potential in the state o f Tennessee 
(22.4%) and Saudi Arabia (15.3%). We expect the type of threat to be mostly economic 
(55.6%), but also government (25.0%) in nature. Although Tennessee only appeared in 
one document, it was not classified as having non-threat potential. As before, we expect 
that the probable target location for this threat is the United States as a country, especially 
since the United States appeared in 400 unique documents during the threat prediction 
window, with 42.3% being classified as having threat potential. Of these threat-related 
documents, 92 were classified as being economic in nature while financial (18.3%), 
government (10.1%), and business (8.3%) threat types fell a distant second through 
fourth, respectfully. During the threat prediction window, relations between the U.S. and 
Japan were increasingly tense as a result of the pending trade sanctions by the U.S. in 
response to foreign trade barriers and unfair competition (Reuters-21578, Distribution 1.0 
1987), perhaps lending support for the maximum likelihood o f an economic threat in the 
United States.
Of the six unique documents containing Saudi Arabia, only one document 
represented a financial threat over aid promised to another country, though several other 
documents classified with threat potential included other locations in the Middle East that 
may account for this probable target location.
The threat prediction profile for time step 958 that corresponds to the calendar 
dates from April 27, 1987, to April 29, 1987, is now presented with the classification 
results and interpretive remarks for the threat prediction window from April 28, 1987, to
77
May 4, 1987, in Table 6-12. Complete detailed tables for time steps 958 through 964 can 
be found in Table B-5 through Table B - ll  in the Appendix B.
Table 6-12: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 958.
time step: 958 date: 04 l'dT
.......... ".“.'.'.'V.'-i'..
threat prediction window: 04/28/1987 to 05/02/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
' 4 fina 0.257 0 fina. 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete financial threat information available.
° govt 0.029 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete government threat information available.
; 0  . ■ secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
; ' l . busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete business threat information available.
9 econ 0.543
China 0 591
0 ccon 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 tran 0.00D ( ! § § tran 0.000 Incomplete transportation threat information available.
0 ' mili 0.029 l i i i l i i 0 mili 0.000 Incomplete military threat information available.
0 comp 0.000 0 comp • 0.000 Incomplete computer threat information available.
1 - envi . 0.057 0 en\i 0.000 Incomplete environmental threat information available.
• ;9 medi 0.029 .
X V <
0 medi 0.000 Incomplete medical threat information available.
3 fina 0.257
0.409
0 fina 0.000 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.029 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
—j 
00
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
1 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
6 econ 0.543 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.057 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0.029 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
China was featured prominently as the probable target location during time steps 
958 through 960 with over 59% in each of these time steps. We see a gradual decrease in 
the economic threat potential from 54.3% down to 37.1% over these time steps while the 
financial threat potential increased from 25.7% to 42.9% over these same time steps. The 
Reuters-21578 collection, unfortunately, does not contain documents in the threat 
prediction window that could be used to validate these claims within the data set. Though 
we still do not have documents inside the threat prediction window to validate our 
prediction, the presence of the United States and Japan, however, in time step 963 with 
the maximum measure of likelihood may be attributed to the ongoing trade sanctions 
imposed by the U.S. against Japan during this time.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Summary of Dissertation
In this dissertation, we develop a model framework for predicting malicious 
intent, defined here as threat potential, using textual content extracted from a specified 
number of cyber sensors. Applying the multinomial Naive Bayes classifier within the 
WEKA environment (Hall, Frank, et al. 2009), we classify the threat potential o f each 
document and use these results to derive the basis for our threat network. We define a set 
objects and conditions based on a system of partial differential equations founded on 
mathematically sound principles in traffic flow theory that allow us to predict the threat 
behavior of the model based on the level o f level of congestion defined in the framework.
We also extract embedded location information from the original text content 
using the GeoMaker interface (Heilmann 2009). We apply the expectation maximization 
(EM) and simple K-means clustering algorithms on these results to yield probable target 
locations associated with an identified threat potential. To provide a more complete 
picture of the potential threat, we calculate a measure of likelihood for each nature of 
threat within each probable target location identified in each threat prediction and present 
these results in a threat prediction profile that provides insight into and better defend 
against an impending threat.
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7.2 Conclusions
While the Reuters-21578 collection used in our experiment was less than ideal, 
the data set still provided us with real data that modeled the type of textual web-based 
content what we might expect from browsing websites today using an electronic device 
such as a smartphone, tablet, or personal computer. Using the data set itself to validate 
our experimental results, we were still able to show reasonable outcomes in predicting 
specific events and their approximate locations during the threat prediction window 
following each threat prediction. We expect that a data set tied more specifically to one or 
more targets with known outcomes that can be validated might yield even better results. 
Setting the basis and reference implementation for defining a threat network using traffic 
flow theory in this dissertation, it is our hope that this work allows traffic analysis 
techniques to branch off in entirely new and innovative directions.
The model framework, however, is sensitive to the number o f cyber sensors n  and 
the value of the segment size m  since the cyber variables, including the cyber density p, 
that affect the level o f congestion are calculated using the arithmetic mean over this total 
threat network length L. The model framework, using a total threat network length L o f 
one, for example, may prematurely predict a threat due to the small sample size in 
calculating the arithmetic mean. On the other hand, a very large threat network length L 
may prove to be too slow in predicting a valid threat due to its large sample size. To 
properly measure the cyber density, we require a large enough, but at the same time not 
too large, network segment that contains enough threat agents to allow for a reasonable 
statistical average. In particular, very large or very small values for the number o f cyber 
sensors or the segment length may distort the threat potential prediction. Intuitively, we
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suppose that a total network length L between four and 40 be used in the model 
framework to obtain reasonable results. Given that the total network length L is the 
product of the number o f cyber sensors n  and the segment length m, either one of these 
values may be adjusted to ensure the total network length L falls in this range of values.
Several issues also persisted when extracting location information from textual 
content using the GeoMaker interface. These included erroneously misperceiving a 
prominent person’s name with a location, failing to identify known locations, and 
mistaking the intended location for a different location with a similar name. One 
document, for example, contained a reference to the Italian city of Venice, but was 
incorrectly identified as the city of Venice, CA, located in the United States. Though 
some of these items are known and documented in this interface, these inaccuracies are 
potential outliers that may skew the results of the clustering algorithm away from the 
actual target location. Additionally, several documents classified as having threat 
potential contained no geographical locations and thus did not influence the target 
location results despite being identified as having threat potential.
7.3 Future Work
Future work for this research should include validation of the proposed model 
framework using a multiple-input time series data set that contains one or more specific 
known threat events so as to establish a direct and definitive correlation between the data 
and the predicted outcome. Equally important would be to evaluate the model framework 
in a real-time setting using active web-crawlers and other existing tools to dynamically 
extract any text content from available cyber sensors. Additional work should also focus
84
on how to insulate the model framework against false positives that may occur in cases, 
for example, when an attacker attempts to spoof the system.
Currently, the nature o f the threat probabilities for each threat prediction are 
applied equally across all probable target locations in the model framework. This may 
lead to inaccurate predictions, especially in the evaluation metric for the measure of 
likelihood of a threat prediction. For example, a threat prediction heavily weighted to be 
military in nature might be applicable for one probable target location, but completely 
inappropriate for another probable target location. Yet the model framework would still 
use the high probability value for the military nature o f the threat in the calculation of the 
measure o f likelihood for a location with no militaristic threat potential. Further work 
should explore adapting the model framework to incorporate calculating a targeted nature 
of threat probability for each probable target location identified in the threat prediction to 
yield improved, more accurate results.
With the goal of improving accuracy and effectiveness, additional research should 
also determine the effects o f expanding the constraints of this model framework, such as 
considering a multi-lane threat network to address categories o f threat types explicitly in 
the calculation of the threat agents themselves. Other concepts from traffic flow theory, 
such as congestion shockwaves and higher order equations, may also prove useful in 
refining and optimizing this model framework. In the past, threat prediction solutions 
were application-specific and relied heavily on human analysis to fully realize any 
conclusions, so we look to automate the model and processes developed within this 
dissertation to the fullest extent as possible so that this work may become a useful and 
valuable traffic analysis tool.
APPENDIX A
TABLE OF VALUES DERIVED USING HEURISTIC METHODS
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Table A -l: Values derived using heuristic methods.
Variable
or
Constant
Domain Value(s)Used Rationale
m m >  1 , integral 3 or 4
The user-defined segment size m  is 
used along with the number o f cyber 
sensors n  in the calculation of the total 
threat network length L. Since the 
model framework is sensitive to the 
total threat network length L, we 
require that the product of m  and n  be 
large enough, but not too large, to 
generate reasonable statistical results 
in our threat prediction. Based on 
experimental data, we choose a value 
of m  to be 3 or 4, depending on the 
number o f cyber sensors n  used, so 
that the total threat network length L 
was between four and 40.
a 0 .0 0 - 1 .0 0 0 .6 5 -0 .8 0
The user-defined jammed threshold 
constant a  is used in the calculation of 
the boundary condition values that 
separates the congested phase from 
the jammed phase. A value of 0.00 for 
a  makes a true jammed phase at the 
extreme values of the calculated cyber 
variables where no movement of 
threat agents on the threat network is 
observed, while a value o f 1 . 0 0  for a  
identifies nearly all threat traffic with 
a congested flow as being in the 
jammed phase. We choose values for 
a  between 0.65 and 0.80 since taking 
action too early or waiting too long to 
take action on a potential threat is not 
desirable.
V 0 .0 0 - 1 .0 0 0.25
The document threat value y  is used 
to indicate a raised threat potential 
found in a document that is 
aggregated as part o f the threat 
indicator value s* for each cyber 
sensor during a measurement interval. 
We choose a value of y  to be 0.25 to 
correspond with the Homeland 
Security Advisory System created in 
response to the September 11 attacks.
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The constant co found in the scaling
function /? is used along with the
natural logarithm of the number of
clusters k to yield a measure of
0) (o >  1 0 , integral 40 likelihood A between zero and ten, inclusively. Based on experimental 
data, we choose a value of co to be 40 
that resulted in nearly all values for 
the measure of likelihood to be within 
the desired range.
APPENDIX B
THREAT PREDICTION PROFILE RESULTS FROM REUTERS-
21578 COLLECTION
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Table B-l: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 298.
time step: 298 date: 03/16/1987 /silifeft threat prediction window: 03/17/1987 to 03/22/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
' 6  ; ; fina 0.314 l l i i p i l g i l l 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
2 govt 0.086
i l p l
.... ■ ■ ■
1 ..gpvt. 0.071
Government threat includes U.S. opposition to 
Japanese takeover bid of a French-controlled 
corporation.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
-  1 busi 0.057 i l i i i l i l J I H MiiBii 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
1 0 .. econ 0.486.
France 0.213
„12' econ 0.857
Economic threats include concerns mainly over 
farm subsidies, especially for sugar crops, and 
economic reflation; additional threats include 
complaints that the European airliner is being 
unfairly subsidized and a ban on French vessels 
from Canadian fishing ports.
0 tran IHXIIJ 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 SliSiSii 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
00
1
. i
en\i
m Hb P I
0.029 lillli cm i 0.071 Environmental threat includes dormancy of winler grains in France.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 IIBIIj medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
6 fina 0.314 i fina 0 . 2 0 0
Financial threat includes the negotiation of the 
delicate balance between western style banking 
and the Islamic legal system.
2 govt 0.086 i govt 0 . 2 0 0
Government threat includes the release of a 
kidnapped Saudi Arabian diplomat after 64 
days of captivity.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
9 econ 0.486
Saudi Arabia 0 .2 0 1
3 econ 0.600
Economic threats include concerns for the 
recovery of the Saudi Arabian economy and the 
ending of the Iraq-Iran war.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
1 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
- 4 fina 0.314
lig ifiU
•
1 fina 0.143
Financial threat includes Colombia's rejection 
of Brazil's suspension of interest payments on 
private bank debt.
1 T govt 0.086 . 0 govt 0.000 No government threats found.
0 ■ secu 0.000 0 secu 0.000 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.057 J p l bu>>i 0.000 No business threats found.
6 . econ 0.486 Colombia 0.131 6 econ 0.857
Economic threats include concerns over the 
economic impact of falling coffee prices and 
the unstable sugar market.
0 tran 0.000 . 0 tran 0.000 No transportation threats found.
;0 mili 0.029 ^Sli mili 0.000 No military threats found.
0 comp 0.000 ■ - 0 comp 0.000 No computer threats found.
'  * '0 envi 0.029 0  • envi 0.000 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0.000 I l l l g l i •0 medi 0  0 0 0 No medical threats found.
3 fina 0.314
TX, USA 0.103
3 fina 0.429
Financial threats include collapse of the 16th 
financial institution in Texas, the 45th 
nationwide, securities laws violations involving 
Texas-based corporations, and a debt proposal 
to address a deepening debt crisis in Latin 
America.
1 govt 0.086 0 govt 0.000 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.057 2 busi 0.286
Business threats include a two billion dollar 
lawsuit filed in Texas state court alleging one 
natural gas corporation is unlawfully attempting 
to gain control of another's gas reserve and 
pipeline system.
5 econ 0.486 2 econ 0.286 Economic threats include concerns related to the oil and gas industry downturn.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
' 3 ' fina 0.314 M i l l fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
1"  ,i govt 0.086 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0
MI, USA - 0.090
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.057 ; 3 ' busi - 0.750
Business threats include issues concerning 
merger proposals and contract negotiations 
involving Michigan-based automakers.
•
: 4  • "econ 0.486 ‘0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
' 0  1 tran 0 .0 0 0 . iilpliU li i l tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.029 ik>- 1 1 1 ! mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 M M 0 comp
II.MM) No computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0  ' medi 0 . 0 0 0 M r medi 0.250 Medical threat includes FDA approval of AZT as a treatment for AID S.
2 fina 0.314 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
1 govt 0.086 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
4 econ 0.486
Gabon 0.078
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
VOu>
■........... ......
' ‘ 2  ' . fina 0.314 . , 5 fina 0.500
Financial threats include requests for economic 
recovery loans as well as interest relief from 
existing loans.
0 govt 0.086 h w h m m i 0
 ^ v ' s 
go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 M M
f t
secu 0 . 0 0 0 ' No security threats found.
0 busi 0.057 H l i # ! ' busi 0 . 1 0 0
Business threat includes the purchase of a 
significant number of shares of partially 
sequestered stock by the Philippines 
government.
3 econ 0.486 Philippines 0.057 i i i i l a i e,con 0 . 1 0 0
Economic threat includes concerns about long­
term problems from a rapidly increasing 
population.
t. « »* 
0  ■ tran 0 . 0 0 0 i l l l iS i l l l l l l l iS 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.029 ’' ’ ‘ i 0 mill 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
, ^  o envi 0.029 SliSili! 3 envi 0:300
Environmental threats include an attack by 
communist rebels against soldiers on patrol in 
the southern Philippines and concerns about dry 
weather affecting crops.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 I j l H p l medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
l fina 0.314 Taiwan 0.041 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
0 govt 0.086 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
2 econ 0.486 6 econ 1 .0 0 0
Economic threats include issues stemming from 
the trade surplus with the U.S. and the 
decreasing value of exports.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
1 fina n U4
. . . . . . .
2 fina 0.080
Financial threats include the opposition of 
Soviet membership in the World Bank or IMF 
and issues concerning Sudan's failure to meet 
scheduled debt repayments.
0 govt 0.086 Russia 0.037 i govt 0.040 Government threats include the opposition of Soviet membership in the World Bank or IMF.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.057 : ■ . 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
■ ■ 2 econ 0.486
.. .. ..
fSltSllil
2i"' ’ econ 0.840
Economic threats include ongoing concerns 
over subsidizing wheat to the Soviet Union, 
inflated industrial production data from padded 
figures, and negotiations to support the cocoa 
and sugar markets. Additional threats include 
an accusation of violating the 1972 Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Treaty and a ban on products 
containing unacceptable radiation levels 
following the Chernobyl accident.
■ 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0  • ■ tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
!• 0 mili 0.029 1 . mili 0.040
Military threat includes controversies 
surrounding India's preparation to launch its 
• first intercontinental-range rocket.
' comp 0 . 0 0 0 ( i l i i l comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029 i g m envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
, 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 i i i i i medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
1 fina 0.314
0.029
0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.086 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threat information available.
0 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
1 econ 0.486 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
v©
Os
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
1 , fina 0.314 SH£3t fina 0 . 0 0 0 No-financial threats found.
0 govt 0.086 iBSlil govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
rV o . secu 0 . 0 0 0 o v secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.057 ,;o-: ' “ busi ‘ 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
* • i : ■' econ 0.486 Uruguay
‘ v  i >. 4
0 .0 2 1 2 econ 1 . 0 0 0
Economic threats include concerns about 
controversial study of level of domestic farm 
subsidies in industrial countries being used as a 
basis for global agricultural negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 .0  ■ >•« - tran ■ 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 . mili 0.029 Slllitf 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
o comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp . 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029
r  ^ 'r f r  ■ u ; I:''-;; ?; | v :  ^ 11
0 envi. 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
'O
II 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 mm medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
Table B-2: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 464.
time step: 464 date: 03'23'1987 threat prediction window 03 '24/1987 to 03 '29,1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
8 fina 0.424; 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
2 govt 0 . 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0.000 1 1 0 -secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threat information available.
-  1 busi 0.030 l i l i i 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
' 6 . :■ econ 0.333 0.185 0 econ • 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
2 mili 0.091 0 ‘mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 o envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
VO
00
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 Iggjj ' 0 \ medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
8 fina 0.424 1 fina 0.500
Financial threat includes strong winter storm 
centered in Oklahoma spreading snow across 
region.
2 govt 0 .1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.030 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
6 econ 0.333 OK, USA 0.185 1 econ 0.500 Economic threat includes request by U.S. for Japan to lift beef import restrictions.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
6 fma 0.424
Iran 0.154
1 fina 0.063
Financial threat includes revised banking secrecy 
laws for Swiss banks stemming from controversial 
use of Swiss accounts in U.S. arms-for-Iran 
scandal.
V l v 2 : govt 0 . 1 2 1 5 go\t 0.313
Government threats include issues surrounding the 
sale of arms to Iran, the U.S. offer of warships to 
escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf, and 
Tunisia's decision to break diplomatic relations
vo
VO
with Iran.
0laifffisSSSBwllRS
--
secu 0.000 0 secu 0.000 No security threats found.
0 ■: busi 0.030 0
. ■■ ■
busi •0.000 No business threats found.
5 . econ 0.333
'■ : T.
iifellll
ISiiiSl
2
■
econ 0.125
Economic threats include the U.S. offer of 
warships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf 
against Iranian anti-ship missiles and re-opening 
of an offshore oilfield in the Gulf once anti-aircraft 
defenses ready.
0 tran 0.000 0 tran 0.000 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.091
:
8 mili 0.500,
Military threats include Iran's protective stance on 
. shipping traffic in the Gulf, the U.S. offer of 
warships to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf, 
and the attack of a supertanker and four Iranian oil 
sites by Iraq.
0 comp 0.000 fepBilit 0 comp 0.000 No computer threats found.
o envi 0.000 0 envi 0.000 No environmental threats found.
\ °; medi 0.000 0 medi ii .100 No medical threats found.
3 fina 0.424 Bolivia 0.083 4 fma 0.444
Financial threats include concerns surrounding 
Brazil's suspension of interest payments and 
Bolivia's proposition to repurchase a significant 
portion of its debt owed to foreign commercial 
banks at a deep discount.
1 govt 0 . 1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.030 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
3 econ 0.333 5 econ 0.556
Economic threats include mounting social unrest 
stemming from a hunger strike by union leaders, 
miners, and university students over higher wages, 
preparation for a summit meeting of Andean Pact 
countries with the U.S, and signing of cooperation 
treaties to make West Germany the biggest 
European Community lender to Bolivia.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
' 3 fina 0.424 11® Una 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
* . r govt 0 .1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0  ; secu 0 . 0 0 0 Croatia 0.075 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.030 ■ 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0  - No business threats found.
econ 0.333
..
0 . 0 0 0
«- < » t
No economic threats found.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 §f§g|§p 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
!1 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 I t f l i f i 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0  ■ No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
o medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
3 fina 0.424 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
1 govt 0 . 1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.030 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
2 econ 0.333
Belgium 0.067
2 econ 1 . 0 0 0
Economic threats include sales of ageing butter to 
reduce a butter surplus and a compromise proposal 
on buffer stock rules of cocoa.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
: 3 fina 0.424
I ll l l iS
25 fina
. . . . . . . . .  j
» # i s
0.625 ’
Financial threats include issues concerning Brazil's 
suspension of interest payments on foreign debts, 
major reforms of the Latin American Development 
Bank, changes to influential government positions, 
and extension requests on short-term credit loans. 
Additional threats include concerns related to the 
downgrade of six U.S. money center bank holding 
companies and the potential for other countries to 
follow Brazil's posture in suspending interest 
payments on foreign debt.
■■ 1 - govt 0 . 1 2 1 I l S f l l l l P I 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0  ■ secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 sccu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
*
. '  O' busi 0.030 Brazil 0.063 o busi ,0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
B l l l l l l , ; econ 0.333
; s;|3'|»l5'vC
15 ccon . >0.375
Economic threats include issues surrounding the 
spread of Brazil's labor unrest that resulted in 
national strikes across different market segments 
over pay disputes, buffer stock rules for cocoa, 
export policies on coffee, and increasing steel 
exports to the U.S. Additional threats include 
keeping its computer market closed to foreign 
goods and preparation for a summit meeting of the 
Andean Pact countries with the U.S.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 ; No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.091 llf f l l l l 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0  ' No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 (• em i 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0
i.'i:
i i i i i 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
3 fina 0.424 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
1 govt 0 . 1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.030 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
2 econ 0.333
MD, USA 0.063
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
' 2  ' fina 0.424 i l i g i 0 fina 0  0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
r '  'I . '- , govt 0 .1 2 1 0 go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0.047 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threat information available.
0 busi 0.030 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
' " 2 econ 0.333 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
I—*o
' 0 trail 0.000 0 tran 0.000 No transportation threat information available.
' V 0 mili 0.091 0 mili .0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0.000 0 comp 0.000 No computer threat information available.
0 . envi 0.000 liilll 0 envi O'.OOO No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0.000 ffftlilttfgl 0 medi ' 0.000 No medical threat information available.
2 fina 0.424 0 fina 0.000 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0 .1 2 1 0 govt 0.000 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0.000 0 secu 0.000 No security threat information available.
0 busi 0.030 0 busi 0.000 No business threat information available.
1 econ 0.333
0.039
0 econ 0.000 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0.000 0 tran 0.000 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.091 0 mili 0.000 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0.000 0 comp 0.000 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.000 0 envi 0.000 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0.000 0 medi 0.000 No medical threat information available.
> ~ 1 liiu 0.424
\iucn.i 0.028
p ill fina 0.333 Financial threat includes an agreement to reschedule some of Nigeria's official debts.
■ ■ ‘ . 0 go\t 0 .1 2 1 go\t 0.000 No go\ ernment threats found.
mmmsecu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
: - - 0 busi 0.030 ■ , 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
■ 1 econ 0.333 2 econ - 0.667
Economic threats include negotiations with 
Ecuador to lend crude oil for export until its 
pipeline is repaired from damage caused by a 
major earthquake and passage of a bill by the U.S. 
to establish farm trade and aid missions to 
overseas customers.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0  ‘ No transportation threats found.
§ |||||i || mili 0.091 lilili 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
, , 0  . envi 0 . 0 0 0 liliglB 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
0 fina 0.424 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
0 govt 0 .1 2 1 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 busi 0.030 Zimbabwe 0 . 0 1 2 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
0 econ 0.333 2 econ 1 . 0 0 0
Economic threats include a suspected outbreak of 
foot and mouth disease affecting meat exports to 
Botswana and the signing of a trade protocol with 
India for asbestos fiber in exchange for Indian 
goods.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.091 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
Table B-3: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 465.
time step: 465 date: 03 23'1987 threat prediction .window: 03/24/1987 to 03/29/1987
s s „ ' .
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
-Zp
» ‘ >' t r-
fina 0.324
MS, USA
KSiiill
0.245
i ia a fina 1 0 0 0
Financial threats include strong winter storm 
across region and acquisition strategies amidst 
federal regulatory changes in the banking 
industry.
2 govt 0.088 iiiiilBiifii M B go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 liiPiiiilsli i n i secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
-1 busi 0.059 0 busi 0 .0 0 ' i No business threats found.
•9 econ 0.412- i l i l a p 0 econ 0 .0 0 " No economic threats found.
'  0 - ' tran 0 . 0 0 0
Hs8 |i|lip
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.088 0 mill 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
envi 0.029 •o. envi, 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
. 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 ' 0  - medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
6 fina 0.324 1 fina 1 .0 0 0 Financial threat includes concerns surrounding the devaluation of Sudan currency.
2 govt 0.088 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.059 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
7 econ 0.412 Saudi Arabia 0.206 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
1 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
' 1
'■';f S ' \ , ' fma 0.324
SB
|| | l p l l 4lllf iJ i’!
■: ■■:: . .V.
25 lina 0.625
Financial threats include issues concerning 
Brazil's suspension of interest payments on 
foreign debts, major reforms of the Latin 
American Development Bank, changes to 
influential government positions, and extension 
requests on short-term credit loans. Additional 
threats include concerns related to the downgrade 
of six U.S. money center bank holding companies 
and the potential for other countries to follow 
Brazil's posture in suspending interest payments 
. on foreign debt.
.][ 1 , govt 0.088
..■■■■
o gov t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0  . secu 0 . 0 0 0 ■i-f 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 t ' busi 0.059 Brazil it WO 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
< ' ’ 
6 econ 0.412
i l | i i | i l
15 ,econ 0.375
Economic threats include issues surrounding the 
spread of Brazil's labor unrest that resulted in 
national strikes across different market segments 
overpay disputes, buffer stock rules for cocoa, 
export policies on coffee, and increasing steel 
exports to the U.S. Additional threats include 
keeping its computer market closed to foreign 
. goods and preparation for a summit meeting of 
the Andean Pact countries with the U.S.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
.  1 mili 0.088 IIIIS ll . 0  < mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
o comp 0 . 0 0 0 . ■ ■. 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
J 1 0 envi 0.029 0 emi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
2 fina 0.324 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.088 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.059 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
3 econ 0.412
0.079
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
1 mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
2 fina 0.324
Australia 0.071
i g i p i fina 0.214
Financial threats include the downgrade of 
•commercial paper programs, sales of non­
performing assets of government financial 
institutions, and an appeal by Sri Lanka for aid to 
help overcome worst drought in decades.
i'-'l, .govt 0.088 2 goid -0.143 Government threats include political activities of the ruling and opposition parties
’ o secu 0 . 0 0 0 SfltlSli 8S2 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 . No economic threats found.
on
mbusi' *<• 0.059 ; | l l | j ^ l ! l | l j | i m u m j g | p i busi 0.071
Business threat includes cash bid offer for all 
issued shares of New Zealand company.
w m g m
^ p l l l l l* l l j l
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iSiiilllit
' 0,412
i i i i i l i i i i s
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Economic tlireats include issues with the 
petroleum taxation structure, agricultural policy 
reform, tough import restraints of steel to the 
U.S.. and oil production potential in Papua New 
Guinea. Additional threats include actions to 
control wheat surpluses and the first U.S.-built 
cars sold o\crseas by a foreign auto company.
0  , tran 0 . 0 0 0
. i "-0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
' 1 - mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
. 0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
2 fina 0.324 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.088 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0
0.071
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.059 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
3 econ 0.412 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
1 mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
2  ' fina 0.324 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
1 ' • govt 0.088 n go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0  non t f M M M 0•
secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
(I busi 0 059 jjMBWji 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 .No business threats found.
3 econ 0.412
Belgium 0.071
i i g l econ 1 .0 0 0
Economic threats include sales of ageing butter to 
reduce a butter surplus and a compromise 
proposal on buffer stock rules of cocoa.
> 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 m i l tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
‘ . 1 mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
llllSStll comp 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 . envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 : medi 0 . 0 0 0 Siillililiil 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
2 fina 0.324
0.055
0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.088 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.059 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
2 econ 0.412 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.088 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
■ 1' ' fina 0.324 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
0 govt 0.088 1 * 1 go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
0
e  * v  *
. secu 0 . 0 0 0 i i i i i i i i i i i a llsliilltl 0 secu . 0 . 0 0 0 No security,threats found.
M busi 0.059
.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
“i econ 0.412
Indonesia 0.040
5 econ 1 . 0 0 0
Economic threats include issues on how to adjust 
to lower world oil prices, passage of a bill by the 
U.S. to establish farm trade and aid missions to 
overseas customers, and disagreement on 
effectiveness of new pact for the rubber industry.
V o, tran 0 . 0 0 0 i | * p i | 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0  / . mi l i 0.088 0 mili ' 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0
ass Ssil comp I )  ( M i l l No'computer threats found.
0 envi 0.029
ilif •IP envi I )  ( M ) ' ] No environmental threats found.
' 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 | H l ! IIS® medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
Table B-4: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 609.
time step: 600 date: 03-30 1987 threat prediction n indow: 03/31/1987 to 04/06/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
‘ 1 fina 0.056 2 fina 1 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
govt 0.250 iJlliSI - govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 ;v -i-p fS' < 0 secu ,0.000 No economic threat information available.
1 b,usi 0.028 0.231 0 busi ■ 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
' 10 econ 0.556. 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
r 1 tran 0.028 K 5 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
;>■ 2 :': mili 0.083 ‘ 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
g | | l i l j
ip llflS
comp 0 .0 0 0 w m comp 0 .0 0 0
■
No computer threat information available.
envi 0 .0 0 0 i j f t S envi .-MUM. No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 .0 0 0 I l g g i medi 0 .0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
1 fina 0.056 0 fina 0 .0 0 0 No financial threats found.
5 govt 0.250 0 govt 0 .0 0 0 No government threats found.
0 secu 0 .0 0 0 0 secu 0 .0 0 0 No security threats found.
1 busi 0.028 0 busi 0 .0 0 0 No business threats found.
1 0 econ 0.556
TN, USA 0.224
0 econ 0 .0 0 0 No economic threats found.
1 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 .0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
2 mili 0.083 0 mili 0 .0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 .0 0 0 0 comp 0 .0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 .0 0 0 0 envi 0 .0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 .0 0 0 0 medi 0 .0 0 0 No medical threats found.
1 fina 0.056 1 fina ■ 1 .0 0 0 Financial threats include terms of aid promised to Senegal over next three years.
■ 3 govt 0.250 Saudi 
Arabia:: ' 0.153
0 govt o:ooo No government threats found.
0  . secu 0 .0 0 0 ' 0 ‘ secu ; o.ooo No security threats found.
. : 0  ' busi 0.028 . . o ' busi 0 .0 0 0 No business threats found.
7 econ 0.556 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
; ' 0 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
i ’ mili 0.083 0 mili - 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 Cl'llip 0  non SHHiit 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 -No computer threats found.
i) envi 1) ' K i l l 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0
.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
0 fina 0.056 2 fina 0.667
Financial threats include issues concerning effects 
of U.S. economic and monetary policy with rise of 
U.S. prime rates.
2 govt 0.250 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.028 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
5 econ 0.556
Belgium 0.097
1 econ 0.333
Economic threat includes the need to strengthen 
Europe's joint currency float and concern over 
turbulent foreign exchanges.
0 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
1 mili 0.083 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
* Kipr.y.. % 0 fina 0.056 iilfti 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
ISSillllli govt 0.250 ifjfjlfiSl 2 govt- : 1 . 0 0 0 Government threats include disagreement with Greece over oil rights in the Aegean Sea.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 j>ecu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
0 busi 0.028 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
4 , econ 0.556 Turkey 0.088 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
.'-; , 0  ' tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
1 -mili 0.083 IIlist - 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 IBM comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0< . < iillii jlljl envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
0 fma 0.056 0 fma 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
2 govt 0.250 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0
0.081
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.028 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
4 econ 0.556 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
1 mili 0.083 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
0 ■ fina 0.056 I f l i H 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threats found.
1 govt 0.250
. . .
2 govt ■ 1 .0 0 0 Government threats include disagreement with Turkey over oil rights in the Aegean Sea.
0 | :sefeu;^ 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
0 . busi 0.028 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threats found.
' / v  ? - V : econ 0.556 Greece 0.065 0 ccon 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threats found.
°=. tran 0.028 m i tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
.  \  0  , ‘ mili 0.083 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threats found.
■' ° . comp <* I'dU ■■■■-■ o comp (Mil III No computer threats found.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 cmi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
’ ' 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 ■ I ) medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
0 fina 0.056 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.250 Namibia 0.036 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.028 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
2 econ 0.556 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.083 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
\
o fina 0.056 9 fina 0.818
Financial threats include issues concerning the 
debt restructuring package with commercial banks.
:• 1 govt 0.250 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threats found.
S S f K i S secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No security threats found.
l l l l l l l : busi 0.028
Philippines 0.026
1 busi 0.091
Business threat includes a compromise on a 
disputed block of sequestered shares controlled by 
government.
l l i l l l i econ 0.556. 1 econ 0.091 Economic threat includes the quality of coconut fiber products from Sri Lanka.
■ 0 tran 0.028 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threats found.
0 mili 0.083 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 ■ No military threats found.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threats found.
' .a  0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 H i i i i i i i n 0 en\i 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threats found.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 IJ IS 1 8 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threats found.
Table B-5: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 958.
lime step: 958 date: 04/27 1987 threat prediction window: 04'28' 1987 to 05'02 1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
' 4> fina 0.257 H H H fina ' 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.029- 0 go\t 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete government threat information available.
0  . secu 0 . 0 0 0
C v
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
1 busi 0.057 China - * 0.591 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete business threat information available.
9 econ 0.543 0  . ..econ 0 . 0 0 0 ' Incomplete economic threat information available.
, 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 i ' 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete transportation threat information available.
, 0 ; mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 IN comp 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete computer threat information available.
' 1 . envi 0.057 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete environmental threat information available.
0 |mediT 0.029 IlflllliSlS 1* medi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete medical threat information available.
3 fina 0.257 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.029 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
1 busi 0.057 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
6 econ 0.543
0.409
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.057 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0.029 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
Table B-6: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 959.
t i l i u  s te p .  l»*‘) d a te :  114 2"  I 'A "
• ’ 1 - v;>' »v5 .* threat prediction window: 04 28 1987 to 05/02/1987t
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
. ■ ■.
l i g i i i i fma 0.343' i i i l i i s 0 fma 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete financial threat information available.
/  ■ i . • govt 0.057 m S W M 0 go\t ii in 10 Incomplete government threat information available.
V  o secu 0 . 0 0 0 , . 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0  .. busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi ,0 . 0 0 0 hi complete business threat information available.
8 econ 0.514
China 0.594
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
' * 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0.000 Incomplete transportation threat information available.
, 0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0.000 Incomplete military threat information available.
0 comp 0.000 0 comp 0.000 Incomplete computer threat information available.
B j i S l i envi 0.057 ■ ' 0 envi 0.000 Incomplete environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0.000 0 medi 0.000. Incomplete medical threat information available.
4 fma 0.343 0 fma 0.000 No financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.057 0 govt 0.000 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0.000 0.406 0 secu 0.000 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.000 0 busi 0.000 No business threat information available.
6 econ 0.514 0 econ 0.000 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.057 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
Table B-7: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 960.
time step: 960 date: 04/28/1987 threat prediction window: 04/29/1987 to 05/03/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
. > fina 0.429
China
| B | i g 8S !
0.591
0 fina 0.000 Incomplete financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.086 0 govt 0.000 Incomplete government threat information available.
-0 • secu 0.000 0 secu 0.000 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.000 0 busi 0.000 Incomplete business threat information available.
econ 0.371 0 econ 0.000 Incomplete economic threat information available.
nm m sw rnsm xm
,
tran
< *
■ ■■■•I • 
0 (111(1 0 tran 0.000 Incomplete transportation threat information
available.
0 < mili 0.029 lllfiilifii i) mili 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete military threat information available.
0  : comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 , comp 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.086 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete enviromnental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 ' medi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete medical threat information available.
5 fina 0.429 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.086 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
4 econ 0.371
0.407
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.086 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
Table B-8: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 961.
. time step: 961 date: 04/28/1987 threat prediction window: 04/29/1987 to 05/03/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
■, . 9 fina 0.382 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
' 3 govt 0  118 0 gov t' 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
• 0  , secu 0 . 0 0 0 IlSiSRIlf 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi-, 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
1 0 econ 0.441
0.361
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
‘ mili 0.029 II mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 Ijplj comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
• 1 envi 0.029 lllftjf! 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
'■ ' 0  ' : : medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
7 fina 0.382
MO, USA 0.303
0 fma 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete financial threat information available.
2 govt 0.118 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete business threat information available.
9 econ 0.441 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete transportation threat information available.
1 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete medical threat information available.
•v- '  4  • fma 0.382' 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete financial threat information available.
•' 1 ' govt 0.118 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete government threat information available.
' • o , ■ secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 ' Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete business threat information available.
4 econ 0.441 Burma .0.155 0 econ, 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete transportation threat information available.
'• 0 mili 0.029 IlSlIlst! II mili 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0  • Incomplete computer threat information available.
. 0  . envi 0 029 l i i l l l 0 envi .0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete environmental threat information available.
' 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete medical threat information available.
3 fma 0.382 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.118 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete business threat information available.
3 econ 0.441 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 Brazil 0.119 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.029 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 Incomplete medical threat information available.
2 fina 0.382 j l i i i ! fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
0  > govt 0.118
0.061
U S B govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
2 econ 0.441 g li|g |ttg g |§ § l l j j g HUE ccon 0 . 0 0 0 \ o  economic threat information available.
' '“'O' tran 0 . 0 0 0 MB I I B tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.029 0
v <
mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0  # comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
. 0 envi 0.029 . o ' envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 ' medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi' 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
Table B-9: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters-21578 
collection for time step 962.
time step: 962 date: 04/29/1987 threat prediction window: 04/30/1987 to 05/04/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
• 4 fina 0.289 m i l l # i g f l j lina 0  0 0 0 No linancial threat information available.
■ <" ; 2 , , \ govt 0.132 t i i i i s s i 0 govt 0.000 No go\ eminent threat information available.
. ‘ 0 ■ secu 0.000 China 0.529 p m secu 0.000
■ ■ ■
No economic threat information available.
i i j l i i i p i busi 0 .0 0 ' i m i busi 0.000 No business threat information available.
1 8 ^ ^
i *
ccon 0.553 0 0 . 0  1" No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0.000 j j H § tran 0.000 No transportation threat information available.
i i s i i i i i ! mili 0.000 l i i i s l l l g i i i mili 0.000 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0.000 i i i i i i l i 0 comp 0.000 No computer threat information available.
1) ’ ,envi 0.026 III envi 0.000 No environmental threat information available.
.  0 medi 0.000 0 medi 0.000 No medical threat information available.
4 fma 0.289 0 fma 0.000 No financial threat information available.
2 govt 0.132 0 govt 0.000 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0.000 0 secu 0.000 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.000 0 busi 0.000 No business threat information available.
7 econ 0.553
0.471
0 econ 0.000 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0.000 0 tran 0.000 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0.000 0 mili 0.000 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0.000 0 comp 0.000 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.026 0 envi 0.000 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0.000 0 medi 0.000 No medical threat information available.
Table B-10: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters- 
21578 collection for time step 963.
■ time step: 963 : date: 04/29/1987 threat prediction window: 04/30/1987 to 05/04/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
6 fina 0 .2 1 1 lipflilS 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
3  ' ■ govt 0.105 SI 0 go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
J * O ' secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
1 busi 0.026 | | | | | | | 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
1 0 econ ,0.632
Japan . 0.350
0 ccon 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
I S S I I S S tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 . v ; 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0  ; comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
.envi 0.026 .■ ■ 111811 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 .. 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
4 fina 0 . 2 1 1
MO, USA 0.259
0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
2 govt 0.105 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
1 busi 0.026 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
1 0 econ 0.632 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
1 envi 0.026 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
' 3 fma 0 .2 1 1 0 fina 0 .0 0 0 ' No financial threat information available.
i i i i i i s s i s i govt 0.105. 0 go\t 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 , secu 0 . 0 0 0 I 1I S I11S8S I 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
; 0 busi 0.026 I l l l l i l i i S 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
;v ' 8 , econ 0.632 Germany 0.165 0 ccon 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
o mili 0 . 0 0 0 0 mili 0 .0 0 0 - No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
• 0 envi 0.026 0 enyi. 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
o medi 0 . 0 0 0 Himedi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
2 fina 0 . 2 1 1 0 fma 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
1 govt 0.105 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.026 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
5 econ 0.632
Cambodia 0 . 1 0 2
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.026 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
' , 1 fma 0 . 2 1 1 I l l l l l i i l S I 0 fma 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.105 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
- • , secu 0 . 0 0 0
Iran 0.045
>1 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
. 0 busi 0.026 0 busi 0  0 0 0 No business threat information available.
' ' 2 econ 0.632 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0  ’ No economic threat information available.
- o tran 0.000 0 tran 0.000 No transportation threat information available.
'■ 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 f t p mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 -No computer threat information available.
", •' 0 envi 0.026
. .
n envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 (• medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
1 fma 0 . 2 1 1 0 fma 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
0 govt 0.105 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.026 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
2 econ 0.632
0.045
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0.026 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
■ 1 fma 0 .2 1 1 ji l lp fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
: ■ 0  - govt 0.105 Canada 0.034 l l l l l govt ....... I No govermnent threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0  !
i
j§ggi sccu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
o ■ busi 0.026 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
' ' 2  ; econ 0.632 0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 I) mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
o ' envi 0.026 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
-  o medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
Table B -ll: Threat prediction profile with contextual information validated against actual news items appearing in the Reuters- 
21578 collection for time step 964.
time step: 964 date: 04/29/1987 threat prediction window: 04/30/1987 to 05/04/1987
algorithm prediction results of actual algorithm-predicted threat documents
likelihood nature target location docs nature remarks
• 2 ' '• . fina 0.108
0.573
ii fina■ 0.000 No financial threat information available.
■' 2 govt 0.13.5 ii go\t 0.000 No government threat information available.
0 / secu 0.000 ii secu 0.000 No economic threat information available.
wr/ o-r busi 0.027 HSU busi •I I'll!) No business threat information available.
• 1 0 econ 0.730 o econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0  ' , tran 0 . 0 0 0 f l f g s i 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 „ No transportation threat information available.
. ' 0 - mili 0 . 0 0 0 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 m i i i 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0  . No computer threat information available.
. 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0  s envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
1 fina 0.108 0 fina 0 . 0 0 0 No financial threat information available.
2 govt 0.135 0 govt 0 . 0 0 0 No government threat information available.
0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 0 secu 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 busi 0.027 0 busi 0 . 0 0 0 No business threat information available.
9 econ 0.730
0.427
0 econ 0 . 0 0 0 No economic threat information available.
0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 0 tran 0 . 0 0 0 No transportation threat information available.
0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 0 mili 0 . 0 0 0 No military threat information available.
0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 0 comp 0 . 0 0 0 No computer threat information available.
0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 0 envi 0 . 0 0 0 No environmental threat information available.
0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 0 medi 0 . 0 0 0 No medical threat information available.
U)
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